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INTRODUCTION
Over fifty years ago, V.O. Key decried the lack of a compre-
hensive budgetary theory for government: "[T]he absorption of
energies in the establishment of the mechanical foundation for
budgeting has diverted attention from the basic budgeting prob-
lem... namely: On what basis shall it be decided to allocate x
dollars to activity A instead of activity B?"1 Key's quest was uto-
pian. The question of how to allocate scarce governmental re-
sources is political; neutral principles will not provide answers.
Furthermore, the structure of decisionmaking, or as Professor
Key dismissively labeled it, the "mechanical foundation for budg-
eting," matters greatly. By shaping the choices that are presented
to lawmakers, this structure sets the bounds of the allocational
decisions that so concerned Key. Better "mechanical" rules lead to
more appropriate tradeoffs among the competing claims on lim-
ited resources. Process is vital, regardless of whether lawmakers
and citizens are seeking to change the level of spending or are
struggling to divide a pie of unchanging size.
Congressional budget procedures affecting tax legislation
have assumed greater importance during the past two decades as
several economic and political developments have constrained
available revenue. Before the mid-1980s, lawmakers had little
trouble retaining existing tax expenditures' and funding new
' V.0. Key, Jr., The Lack of a Budgetary Theory, 34 Am Pol Sci Rev 1137, 1138 (1940).
See also id at 1143-44 ("[The question is a problem in political philosophy ... The discus-
sion also suggests the desirability of careful and comprehensive analyses of the budgetary
process."); Aaron B. Wildavsky, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process xvi (Scott,
Foresman 1988) ("Now that budgeting has acquired some of the interested audience it de-
serves, the subject unfortunately has become too difficult to describe. I hope again to show
that the effort to understand is worthwhile. Budget, budget, budget, as congressmen com-
plain, is all we can do unless and until we Americans once again agree on what kind of so-
ciety, and which sort of government, we want.").
2 The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 defines tax ex-
penditures as "revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which al-
low a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a spe-
cial credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability." Pub L No 93-344
§ 3(aX3), 88 Stat 297, codified at 2 USC § 622(3) (1994).
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ones, in part because bracket creep' fueled by high inflation
automatically increased income tax rates and provided new reve-
nue.4 In such an environment, Congress usually could avoid
making explicit tradeoffs among tax expenditures or identifying
the groups who were paying higher taxes to fund the subsidies of
others. Beginning in 1985, Congress indexed tax brackets for in-
flation, thus eliminating this fiscal illusion.5 In addition, the
greater political salience of the federal deficit caused Congress to
adopt new budget rules. These rules both restricted Congress's
ability to place the costs of new federal programs on future gen-
erations and increased the pressure to use new tax revenues for
deficit reduction rather than for new tax subsidies. As lawmakers
hunted for ways to maintain current benefits or establish new
programs, interest groups that benefited from tax expenditures
found themselves increasingly in danger of losing federal funds
they had expected to receive in perpetuity.
Budget rules, along with indexing, both demand and high-
light tradeoffs among federal beneficiaries. Intricate offset provi-
sions dominate federal budgeting, shaping decisions regarding
annual appropriations, entitlement legislation, and the tax code.
They require advocates of new spending to find revenue offsets,
and they limit the kinds of programs that can be eliminated or
scaled back to pay for particular kinds of new spending. Increas-
ingly, the losers in the competition for scarce resources know ex-
actly who they are, and those with organization and clout fight
vigorously to retain their governmental subsidies. This height-
ened awareness of the zero-sum nature of federal allocative deci-
sions is perhaps the most important change in modern federal
budgeting.
This Article considers the budget rules that shape these
tradeoffs in the tax arena, most notably, the "pay-as-you-go" pro-
vision ("PAYGO") enacted in the Budget Enforcement Act of
1990.6 PAYGO requires advocates for new tax expenditures to
pay for them in one of three ways: raising taxes, reducing current
' Until tax brackets were indexed for inflation, tax rate increases occurred automati-
cally as a taxpayer's higher nominal income (largely a result of inflation) would move her
into a higher tax bracket and increase her effective tax rate, even though her real income
remained unchanged. This phenomenon is known as bracket creep.
' C. Eugene Steuerle, The Tax Decade: How Taxes Came to Dominate the Public
Agenda 73 (Urban 1992) (calling this the "easy financing period"). See also Joseph A.
Pechman, Federal Tax Policy 114-16 (Brookings 5th ed 1987) (explaining bracket creep).
' Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub L No 97-34, 95 Stat 172, 188, codified at 26
USC § 1 (1994). The indexation became effective after 1984. 95 Stat at 190.
' Title XIII, Pub L No 101-508, 104 Stat 1388-573, codified as amended at 2 USC
§ 902 (1994).
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tax subsidies, or reducing spending for existing entitlement pro-
grams. The dynamics of the committee structure limit groups
that employ the third strategy to offsets in entitlement programs
within the jurisdiction of the tax writing committees, such as
Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, or welfare. Importantly,
budget rules virtually eliminate the possibility of using programs
that receive annual appropriations as offsets for new tax expendi-
tures or entitlement programs.
I argue that these rules are a mechanism to harness the in-
terest group activity that is already ubiquitous in the tax legisla-
tive arena in order to reach substantive policy goals more easily.7
In addition, such conflict provides lawmakers with opportunities
to review and revise tax subsidies. The structure of this process
encourages legislators to provide reasons for their decisions, thus
increasing their accountability to the electorate. Previous schol-
arship has not provided this perspective. The possible benefits of
congressional rules that use interest group conflict have been ig-
nored or undervalued by the few scholars who have studied them
in the context of tax legislation and by budget scholars generally.
Aaron Wildavsky, the most influential budget scholar of the past
several decades,' seemed to favor relatively consensual decision-
making. He was the primary exponent of "incrementalism"9 and
7 For purposes of this Article, I will use the term "interest group" to refer to "any
group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other
groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of be-
havior that are implied by the shared attitudes." David B. Truman, The Governmental
Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion 33 (Knopf 1965). See also Peter . Schuck,
Against (And For) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 Yale L & Policy Rev 553,
557-58 (1997) (defining "special interest" as "any group that pursues contested political or
policy goals, and that is widely regarded by the public as being one contending interest
among others"). But see Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen-
Legislator, 81 Cornell L Rev 623, 683-84 n 201 (1996) (explaining the difficulty of choosing
a "neutral" definition of interest group).
' Among his many publications are three editions of The Politics of the Budgetary
Process and three editions of The New Politics of the Budgetary Process (the last published
posthumously and coauthored by Naomi Caiden). See, for example, Aaron B. Wildavsky
and Naomi Caiden, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process (Longman 3d ed 1997).
' In the budget context, "incrementalism is a process in which budgetary bases (i.e.,
previous expenditures) are accepted, and decision making is focused on the change from
the base.... [Iln an incremental process, 'budgeting is a stable process in which individ-
ual allocative decisions are sufficiently independent of one another so that tradeoffs are
only implicit, and conflict is thereby minimized." William D. Berry, The Confusing Case of
Budgetary Incrementalism: Too Many Meanings for a Single Concept, 52 J Pol 167, 171-72
(1990), quoting John R. Gist, 'Stability" and "Competition" in Budgetary Theory, 76 Am
Pol Sci Rev 859, 859 (1982). See Aaron B. Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process
136 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1974) ("Conflict is reduced by an incremental approach because
the area open to dispute is reduced."); Wildavsky, New Politics at 439 (cited in note 1)
("Only a political system so polarized that it cannot make [allocation] choices through the
usual legislative, executive, and party mechanisms ... would arrive at a general formula
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defended it in part as a technique that reduced conflict among
budget players."
Although Professor Wildavsky was one of the most astute ob-
servers of the modern budget process, his normative approach is
flawed for current conditions. A theory that ignores or downplays
interest group conflict is not only ill-suited to a world of con-
strained revenues, it also lacks the information-forcing and in-
formation-structuring advantages I describe. Rather than quix-
otically fighting the power of interest groups, as Professor
Wildavsky would do, we should try to harness it. The budget
rules can thus be seen as an application of a basic Madisonian in-
sight. Madison believed that the opportunities for factional activ-
ity are greatest in "[t]he apportionment of taxes."" The trick, he
argued, is to further the public good by finding rules that will
force these "opposite and rival interests," through their self-
interested battles, to "supply[ ]... the defect of better motives." 2
PAYGO and related rules are part of such a political strategy.
In Part I of this Article, I describe the PAYGO rules and
other congressional offset requirements that affect tax bills. A
sustained analysis of the rules and procedures that shape tax
lawmaking is not a typical approach for legal scholars. Tradi-
tional scholarship has been focused on the outcomes produced
through the tax legislative process; commentators have worked to
rationalize tax laws with tax policy norms such as equity, effi-
ciency, and simplicity. My objective is to describe the process that
determines legislative outcomes, which should not only help to
explain them, but also may allow us to anticipate the political
(e.g. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) for maximizing discontent rather than trying to agree,
case by case, on reasonable choices."). But see Wildavsky and Caiden, New Politics at 264-
66 (cited in note 8) (acknowledging that some amount of conflict is inevitable in budget-
ing). See also Roy T. Meyers, Strategic Budgeting 9 (Michigan 1994) (describing challenges
to "incrementalism's consensual bargaining component" and arguing that "competition is
rife in budgeting"); id at 15 ("Another lesson from the criticisms of incrementalism is that
we must recognize that budgeting is an especially competitive process."); Howard E. Shu-
man, Politics and the Budget: The Struggle Between the President and Congress xiv (Pren-
tice Hall 3d ed 1992) (stating that the budget "is not a process but a tale of conflict and
struggle[,]... a barroom brawl"); Eric A. Hanushek, Formula Budgeting: The Economics
and Analytics of Fiscal Policy under Rules, 6 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt 3, 16 (1986) (sug-
gesting that a weakness of "distributional data" in the budget process is that it leads "to
continuing conflict in budgetary debates, conflict that is intensified in times of general
cutbacks").-
In his later writings, Wildavsky referred to incrementalism as "classical budgeting,"
see, for example, Wildavsky, New Politics at 70 (cited in note 1), indicating the increased
influence of different approaches and the changing environment of budgeting.
" Federalist 10 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 77, 80 (Men-
tor 1961).
" Federalist 51 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 320, 322.
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forces that will prevail over time. Congress adopted offset re-
quirements in order to control federal spending, more particu-
larly, to reduce the ability of interest groups and others to receive
new or increased federal benefits. Unlike some budget procedures
that were designed to reduce the federal deficit, PAYGO merely
restrains future growth; it does not directly affect spending for
previously enacted tax subsidies and entitlement programs. Al-
though others have concluded that the rules have been successful
in this deficit control goal," no one has provided a comprehensive
description of how such procedures have raised the costs of en-
acting new federal programs. In Part II of this Article, I provide
just such an analysis. In addition, I discuss the puzzle of why
legislators, who generally prefer to enact new federal programs,
might have adopted rules that make it more difficult to do so.
Virtually the only praise for PAYGO and offset requirements
in the tax arena has been for their ability to restrain new spend-
ing; otherwise, they tend to be criticized on tax policy grounds.
Some commentators have argued that budget rules unnecessarily
increase the complexity of the tax law, and that they conflict with
tax policy goals such as equity and efficiency. 4 Others have wor-
ried that the rules entrench status quo programs and tax subsi-
dies, while placing substantial obstacles in the path of new pro-
posals, some of which may be better uses of federal money. 5 In
" See, for example, James A. Thurber, Twenty Years of Congressional Budget Reform,
25 The Public Manager- The New Bureaucrat 6, 7 (1996) ("The primary impact of PAYGO
has been to discourage spending. The difficulty of either raising taxes or cutting popular
existing mandatory programs has effectively closed out new mandatory programs."); Allen
Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process 41 (Brookings 1995) ("[PAYGO] has
had a marked effect on new legislation .... Congress has achieved substantial deficit re-
duction by increasing revenue and cutting direct spending under existing law while also
offsetting any deficit increases resulting from new legislation."); Philip G. Joyce and Rob-
ert D. Reischauer, Deficit Budgeting: The Federal Budget Process and Budget Reform, 29
Harv J Leg 429, 438 (1992) ("The PAYGO process seems to have discouraged major efforts
to increase entitlement spending or cut taxes or both.").
" See, for example, Robert D. Reischauer, Taxes and Spending under Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings, 43 Nati Tax J 223, 230 (1990) ("[T~he tax debate [in the context of
budget reconciliation packages and under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings rules] has focused
more on the revenue repercussions of pending legislation and less on its policy merits.");
Bernard M. Shapiro, Complexity in the Tax Legislative Process: Problems and Proposals;
Role of Congressional Staff and Taxpayer Representatives, in Tax Management, Proceed-
ings of the Invitational Conference on Reduction of Income Tax Complexity I-J-l, I-J-33
(GPO 1990) ('The pressures of deficit reduction, combined with the short time periods
during which reconciliation bills have been produced, have strained the tax legislative
process significantly. This has resulted in revenue-driven bills that have increased the
complexity of the tax system enormously."); Gene Steuerle, Fair Budget Policy, Bad Tax
Policy, Tax Notes 455 (July 24, 1989) ("As a matter of tax policy.., the [deficit reduction]
rules have not worked well, and the tax code is again being made more complex and more
unfair.").
"S See, for example, Joyce and Reischauer, 29 Harv J Leg at 442 ("The discretionary
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Part III, I suggest a previously unidentified benefit of offset re-
quirements: they provide Congress with an opportunity to assess,
modify, or repeal existing tax expenditures. PAYGO may not only
increase the amount of information about tax expenditures that
private sources produce, but the structure for disclosure that it
erects may allow lawmakers to understand and use relevant in-
formation more appropriately. This consequence somewhat miti-
gates PAYGO's bias in favor of the status quo. My conclusions in
this Part rest on theory and anecdotal evidence and thus are pre-
liminary. Nevertheless, this study lays the foundation for further
empirical analysis.
I. OFFSET REQUIREMENTS FOR TAX LEGISLATION: PAYGO AND
OTHER PROVISIONS
The 1990 Budget Enforcement Act is the most significant re-
cent amendment to the fiscal constitution."6 Included within it is
the PAYGO provision relating to tax and direct spending (largely,
entitlement) legislation.' The Act is the latest addition to an
evolving congressional institution that began largely as a re-
sponse to clashes with the executive branch and was maintained
because of public concern with rising federal deficits.
The first major modern budget law, the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,"s ("Budget Act"9 )
was a vehicle to allow Congress more control over its appropria-
tions process and to coordinate the actions of dozens of commit-
tees that participated in federal budgeting.0 Through these pro-
spending caps ... may do more to freeze out new initiatives... in favor of old ones...
than to kill low priority programs."); Wildavsky and Caiden, New Politics at 150 (cited in
note 8) (arguing that discretionary spending caps favor established programs). In contrast
to these critics, Professor Schuck has suggested that PAYGO and other offset require-
ments that establish a zero-sum game may diminish the distortions of the "logrolling
game." See Schuck, 15 Yale L & Policy Rev at 593-94 (cited in note 7). This statement,
though brief, is consistent with some of my conclusions; the detail I provide may justify
Schuck's decision to label offset requirements as a political "reform."
" This term was first used in legal scholarship by Kenneth Dam in The American Fis-
cal Constitution, 44 U Chi L Rev 271 (1977).
" Entitlement spending, which is also sometimes called mandatory spending, is actu-
ally a subset of direct spending. Direct spending is any spending pursuant to a binding le-
gal obligation to pay, including, for example, interest on the national debt. Entitlement
spending is by far the largest component of direct spending and is usually the kind of
mandatory spending relevant to PAYGO.
Pub L No 93-344, 88 Stat 297, codified at 2 USC §§ 601-88 (1994).
Throughout this Article, the term "Budget Act" is used to refer to the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, as amended. The 1974 Act, as amended,
provides the basic framework for contemporary budget law.
See generally Allen Schick, Congress and Money: Budgeting, Spending, and Taxing
(Urban 1980) (detailing the events that led to the passage of the Budget Act, its legislative
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visions and restrictions on the President's power to impound fed-
eral funds, the legislative branch reclaimed some of its power of
the purse. These congressional rules can be divided into "process
rules," which merely govern how a decision is reached, and "out-
come-oriented rules," which are explicitly designed to facilitate
particular decisions.2 The Budget Act's framework is described
most accurately as one of the former; its process was "neutral on
its face" and could be "deployed in favor of higher or lower
spending, bigger or smaller deficits."'
The next amendment to the fiscal constitution was unabash-
edly outcome-oriented; the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act ("GRH"),
enacted in 1985, aimed to eliminate the deficit by 1991.' In some
cases, GRH required proponents of new discretionary programs to
offset new spending by eliminating or reducing existing pro-
grams.24 The requirement for such tradeoffs, however, was lim-
ited to the discretionary spending arena, which was controlled by
the appropriations committees. Although annual congressional
budget resolutions might require the tax writing committees to
increase revenues or cut entitlement spending, GRH was primar-
history, and its major provisions).
21 Hannushek, 6 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt at 6 (cited in note 9).
Schick, Congress and Money at 73 (cited in note 20). See also Philip G. Joyce, Con-
gressional Budget Reform: The Unanticipated Implications for Federal Policy Making, 56
Pub Admin Rev 317, 318 (1996) ("The act was outcome neutral, truly a process reforn").
As with any attempt to distinguish procedure from substance, these statements are
somewhat misleading- no process is truly neutral. See Ronald F. King, Money, Time and
Politics: Investment Tax Subsidies & American Democracy 1 (Yale 1993) ("Politics is a
structured activity. Its practices are governed by rules, norms, beliefs, and agreements
that define the players, the goals they can pursue, and the means appropriate for pursu-
ing them .... The structures of political life are not neutral in their effects. They all help
determine the types of issues that appear on the political agenda, the kinds of actors who
struggle over those issues, the form of that struggle, and the probable policy result."). By
allowing more coordination in the congressional budget process, the Budget Act strength-
ened the power of the legislative branch relative to the executive branch, created new
budget players such as the budget committees and the Congressional Budget Office
("CBO"), and weakened the appropriations committees. But relative to the subsequent
budget acts-which explicitly sought to reduce federal spending or balance the budget, or
both-the Budget Act is a process, rather than outcome-oriented, rule.
' Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub L No 99-177, 99
Stat 1037, codified as amended at 2 USC §§ 900-08, 922 (1994). Congress amended GRH
in 1987, postponing the balanced budget until 1993. See Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1987, Pub L No 100-119, 101 Stat 754, codified at 2 USC § 901
(1994). For discussions of the legislative history and provisions of GRH, see generally
Rudolph G. Penner and Alan J. Abramson, Broken Purse Strings: Congressional Budget-
ing, 1974 to 1988 (Urban 1988); Allen Schick, The Capacity to Budget (Urban 1990).
2 See Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, 76 Cal L Rev 593, 626 (1988) (explaining this "deficit neutrality" rule).
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ily concerned with controlling the annual appropriations process
and reducing discretionary spending.2
The informal norm of revenue neutrality in tax legislation,
the precursor of PAYGO, developed during the early years of
GRH when the tax writing committees adopted it during their
consideration of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.26 The requirement of
revenue neutrality meant that tax legislation could neither lose
nor raise revenue; any money lost through tax rate reductions or
new tax subsidies had to be offset by provisions raising revenue.
The Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees
adopted this norm to keep the Tax Reform Act free from budget
rules and outside the jurisdiction of the budget committees. 7 In
addition, the decision of the tax writing committees to apply the
norm to any proposed amendment to the chairman's proposal
(called "the mark") was an effective way to discourage amend-
ments and prevent tax reform from unraveling.s Undoubtedly,
lawmakers developed and applied the norm because the notion of
offsets was particularly salient after the adoption of GRH and be-
cause it seemed an effective way to discourage new spending pro-
grams in the form of tax expenditures.
While congressional rules like those of GRH shape informal
norms, the process also works in reverse; norms can shape new
congressional rules." Such was the case with PAYGO, which both
Id at 655-57 (noting that GRH exempted federal entitlements and tax expenditures);
Stanley S. Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 33 (Harvard 1985) (describing
tax expenditures as "largely uncontrolled" under budget procedures of the time).
Pub L No 99-514, 100 Stat 2085, codified at numerous sections of 26 USC (1994).
Schick, Capacity to Budget at 134 (cited in note 23). In addition, "revenue... neu-
trality constraints were largely pursued to prevent policymakers from diverting their at-
tention from the tough choices necessary to reduce inequities and promote the efficient
allocation of resources." Steuerle, The Tax Decade at 107 (cited in note 4). See also Jeffrey
H. Birnbaum and Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and
the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform 29 (Random House 1987) (stating that Senator
Bradley favored revenue neutrality "to avoid the harsh ideological battles that would un-
doubtedly follow if he pushed his measure in either direction" with respect to the deficit).
See, for example, Joseph White and Aaron B. Wildavsky, The Deficit and the Public
Interest: The Search for Responsible Budgeting in the 1980s 488 (California 1989) (quoting
Senator Pryor, who said that the addition of this requirement was "the critical moment in
this bill. After that, it was a totally different game."). See also Edward M. Gramlich, U.S.
Federal Budget Deficits and Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 80 Am Econ Rev 75, 80 (1989)
("Rather than permitting legislators to compete in giving away tax benefits, the GRH
rules enforced in the bargaining on (the Tax Reform Act] forced all giveaway amendments
to be deficit neutral, which took all the fun out of giveaways.").
' See Stith, 76 Cal L Rev at 634 (cited in note 24) ("[Plolitical unease about the deficit,
which intensified as deficits grew during the 1970s and early 1980s, may have made GRH
... inevitable."). Although this process of codifying informal norms occurs in many areas,
it is particularly important in the federal budget process, in which Congress has been
forced to adapt to evolving political and fiscal imperatives. See Schick, Capacity to Budget
at 85 (cited in note 23). See also David C. King, Turf Wars: How Congressional Committees
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codified the norm of revenue neutrality and extended it to new di-
rect spending programs. PAYGO is the primary method used in
the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act30 to bring the "automatic" por-
tion of the budget-taxes and entitlement programs (which are
not subject to the annual appropriations process, but are instead
"permanently" appropriated)-within the scope of the budget pro-
cess. The goal of PAYGO is not to reduce the deficit, to decrease
spending for established entitlement programs, or to inimize
revenue loss from existing tax expenditures. Rather, PAYGO
aims to ensure that new legislation will not increase the deficit.
In other words, if spending for an existing entitlement program
increases because more persons qualify for it or because benefits
are automatically adjusted to account for a higher cost of living,
PAYGO is not triggered. Similarly, if revenue losses from previ-
ously enacted tax expenditures exceed expectations because more
taxpayers claim them, no budget rule requires Congress to find
an offset. However, if higher spending results from new entitle-
ment programs, new tax expenditures, or new laws that expand
existing programs, PAYGO applies.
Under PAYGO, "direct spending and revenue legislation that
increases the deficit in any fiscal year... must be offset by leg-
islation reducing spending or increasing revenues so that the net
deficit is not increased."31 Unlike the earlier revenue neutrality
norm, PAYGO does not require that each bill be revenue neutral;
instead, revenue-losing bills can be offset by other legislation in a
particular fiscal year. Some legislation that would otherwise fall
under the PAYGO rules is exempt, including legislation that the
President and both houses of Congress designate as an emer-
gency. 2 Otherwise, PAYGO applies broadly and indiscriminately
to all revenue and entitlement laws, including legislation enact-
ing additional tax expenditures, broad-based tax relief bills, and
proposals to restructure the tax code. The Office of Management
and Budget keeps a running total of these complicated calcula-
Claim Jurisdiction 59 (Chicago 1997) (arguing that much congressional reform consists of
adopting formal rule changes that mirror institutional changes that have evolved over
time much as the common law does).
"The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 was a small part of a larger budget agreement
that attempted to reduce the deficit by approximately $500 billion over five years through
spending cuts and tax increases. See generally Shuman, Politics and the Budget at 311-35
(cited in note 9) (detailing process).
" Edward Davis, "Tay-As-You-Go" Budget Enforcement Procedures in 1992, CRS Or-
der Code IB92055, preface (1993). See GRH § 252.
"GRH § 252(e). See Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federal-
ism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U Kan L Rev 1113, 1141-42 (1997)
(discussing the exceptions for emergencies and the political nature of that determination).
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tions as a running total on the "PAYGO scorecard." s' If Congress
does not offset any revenue loss in a particular fiscal year by ei-
ther increasing taxes or reducing entitlement spending, funds are
sequestered (automatically and uniformly cut) from certain direct
spending programs to make up the difference.'
PAYGO differs in another important way from the norm gov-
erning the consideration of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. In that Act,
revenue for lower tax rates and new tax expenditures had to be
found in the tax code. PAYGO, on the other hand, allows Con-
gress to offset tax decreases with cuts in entitlement spending;'
it does not limit Congress to raising taxes to achieve revenue
neutrality. Certain consequences of this flexibility have not been
apparent until recently because Congress did not rely heavily on
entitlement cuts to fund tax reductions. The 1990 and 1993 om-
nibus budget reconciliation bills actually raised revenue for defi-
cit reduction, and smaller bills since PAYGO's adoption met offset
requirements primarily by paying for tax subsidies with changes
within the tax code. But in 1997, the Taxpayer Relief Act,3" which
parceled out new tax subsidies worth hundreds of billions of dol-
lars, satisfied PAYGO in large part by matching revenue loss
with direct spending cuts, primarily in Medicare. 7 As Congress
reduces Medicare spending to avert insolvency in the next few
years, the use of direct spending offsets may increase;38 under
' See Davis, "Pay-As-You-Go" in 1992 at CRS 8 (cited in note 31), for an example of a
PAYGO scorecard. Absent congressional action, excess deficit reductions can be carried
over to offset revenue losses in subsequent years.
" Most entitlement spending is exempt from a sequester. For example, Social Secu-
rity, net interest, veterans' compensation and pensions, federal retirement and disability
benefits, and the Postal Service are exempt. Medicare is limited to no more than a 4 per-
cent reduction. GRH §§ 252(cX1), 255. Moreover, tax expenditures are not considered
spending for this purpose, so they are effectively exempt from the threat. Thus, any se-
quester would fall heavily on the few direct spending programs remaining, which in 1996
represented only about $30 billion to $35 billion of all such spending. See Stanley E. Col-
lender, The Guide to the Federal Budget Fiscal: 1997 29 (Rowman & Littlefield 1996).
In the budget context, reductions in federal spending may or may not be absolute
reductions from the previous year's levels. In most cases, reductions are from the current
services baseline, which measures what it would cost in the future to provide the services
the government provides today. See Timothy J. Muris, The Uses and Abuses of Budget
Baselines, in John F. Cogan, Timothy J. Muris, and Allen Schick, eds, The Budget Puzzle:
Understanding Federal Spending 41, 43 (Stanford 1994) (also defining current law and
current policy baselines).
Pub L No 105-34, 111 Stat 789, codified at numerous sections of 26 USCA (Supp
1997).
' See Richard W. Stevenson, Conflicting Views Put Republicans in a Bind on Cutting
Taxes, NY Times A36 (June 8, 1997) (Only $50 billion of the $135 billion proposed tax cut
will be paid for by new tax revenue.).
"The trust fund for the portion of Medicare that covers hospital insurance (Part A) is
projected to be insolvent by 2001. See Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Re-
form, Interim Report to the President 16 (GPO 1994); Marilyn Werber Serafini, Medicare:
The University of Chicago Law Review
PAYGO accounting, unless Congress adopts some sort of mecha-
nism to remove the funds from the scorecard, any revenue saved
by restructuring entitlement programs can be "spent" on new tax
cuts. 9 Certainly, the Taxpayer Relief Act marks a new direction
for PAYGO that may lead policymakers to consider whether they
want to change the budget rules so that savings from entitlement
reform cannot fund new tax expenditures.'
The norm of revenue neutrality also appears in two other
budget rules that affect tax legislation. Annual congressional
budget resolutions usually contain one or more reserve funds that
allow the Senate to pass revenue and/or direct spending legisla-
tion for enumerated purposes so long as this legislation does not
increase the deficit in the first fiscal year covered by the budget
resolution, the five year period covered by the budget resolution,
and the next five fiscal years.41 Reserve funds provide the Senate
Finance Committee some flexibility to consider revenue neutral
tax legislation that is only generally anticipated when Congress
considers the budget resolution.42 The Senate enforces reserve
fund provisions through parliamentary procedure. If a bill vio-
lates any of the three revenue neutrality requirements, a senator
can raise a substantive point of order to prevent its consideration.
After debate, the Senate votes whether to sustain or waive the
point of order. Under the Budget Act, the objection can only be
waived by a vote of three-fifths of all the senators (sixty votes, if
there are no vacancies).' Thus, unlike the PAYGO requirement,
Round Two, Natl J 2632 (Dec 7, 1996). A national commission will report to Congress at
the end of 1998 with reform proposals to ensure financial viability. Marilyn Werber Sera-
fini, Taking a Look Into Medicare's Future, Natl J 1638 (Aug 16, 1997).
For example, the 104th Congress removed $6.2 billion from the PAYGO balance so
that it would not be available to offset revenue losses in future legislation and would be
applied to deficit reduction. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 §§ 101
et seq, Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009, codified at numerous USC Titles.
"But see Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1998 § 336, H Con Res
84, 105th Cong, 1st Sess, in 143 Cong Rec E1134 (June 5, 1997) (providing "Sense of the
Senate," see note 158, that nothing should prohibit Congress from providing further tax
cuts that are offset by spending reductions or additional revenue).
" See, for example, Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1996
§ 203(aX1X3), H Con Res 67, 104th Cong, 1st Sess, 109 Stat 996 (June 29, 1995). Typi-
cally, reserve funds for tax legislation double the period of the relevant budget "window"
past the five year perspective required of budget resolutions. Compare id with Section 606
of the Budget Act. Because the 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act enacted a net tax cut (paid for by
reductions in direct spending), the fiscal year 1998 budget resolution did not contain a re-
serve fund for tax legislation, although it did provide for one that would have allowed defi-
cit neutral surface transportation legislation. See H Con Res 84 § 210.
, See Collender, Guide to the Federal Budget: Fiscal 1997 at 55-56 (cited in note 34).
" See Garrett, 45 U Kan L Rev at 1161 (cited in note 32) (contrasting substantive
points of order in the budget process with the parliamentary devices used generally to en-
force congressional rules). The budget process is characterized by supermajority voting re-
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the pay-as-you-go provision in the Senate applies only within in-
dividual bills and is enforced through a parliamentary device,
rather than through sequestering funds. Although the reserve
fund provisions apply only in the Senate, constraints on Senate
deliberations indirectly constrain the House, which in most cases
will be unwilling to pass legislation that will be out of order in
the Senate.
Finally, Section 311(a) of the Budget Act prohibits amend-
ments to a budget reconciliation act if they "would cause revenues
to be less than the appropriate level of total revenues set forth in
quirements in the Senate that provide enforcement for a number of rules, some of them
amazingly arcane. See, for example, Charles Tiefer, Congressional Practice and Procedure:
A Reference, Research, and Legislative Guide 908-14 (Greenwood 1989) (describing basic
points of order). The increasing use of supermajority voting requirements to make certain
legislative outcomes more difficult to enact has begun to elicit academic commentary. For
example, questions concerning the wisdom and constitutionality of the recent House rule
requiring a three-fifths vote to raise federal tax rates have sparked debate. See Bruce
Ackerman, et al, An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 Yale L J 1539 (1995) (criti-
cizing the rule); John 0. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of
Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 Yale L J 483 (1995) (criticizing
Ackerman and supporting the rule); Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in
Congress, 46 Duke L J 73 (1996) (criticizing McGinnis, Rappaport, and the rule). Others
have questioned the ability of one Congress to entrench its policy preferences and to re-
duce the options available to future legislative majorities. See Catherine Fisk and Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 Stan L Rev 181, 248 (1997) ("[The [Supreme] Court has
expressed the same view that it is unconstitutional for a legislature to bind its succes-
sors."); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 Am Bar Found Res J 379 (1987); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and
the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13 Hastings Const L Q 185, 188 (1986) (ar-
guing that "[tihe kind of control of the legislative function that [GRil] intends can only be
accomplished constitutionally through the amendment process, not by statute"). But see
Lynn A. Baker and Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time has Gone?,
8 J L & Pol 21, 56 (1997) (discussing use of supermajority voting in Senate to counter
structural problems of representation, such as the bias in favor of less populated states). A
consideration of this literature is beyond the scope of this Article. It is worthwhile, how-
ever, to offer two brief comments here. First, in the budget context, supermajority re-
quirements and other institutionalized structures can operate as precommitment devices
to avoid collective action problems that reduce Congress's ability to achieve preferred pol-
icy outcomes. See Garrett, 45 U Kan L Rev at 1132-33 (cited in note 32); Saul Levmore,
Precommitment Politics, 82 Va L Rev 567 (1996). Of course, they can also block desired
shifts in policy. Second, Professor Kiarman distinguishes between a "majoritarian pre-
commitment," which allows "today's majority to bind itself against future temptations,"
and "cross-temporal entrenchment," which involves "today's majority seeking to control fu-
ture majorities." Michael J. Kiarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment
Problem, 85 Georgetown L J 491, 507 (1997). Majoritarian precommitment is less prob-
lematic for all those who have studied entrenchment (although Kiarman's distinction may
be difficult to make in practice because any law lacking a sunset provision has elements of
both). Both the ability of a simple majority to alter budget rules (including supermajority
requirements) and the frequent amendments to the budget acts suggest that budget rules
are majoritarian precommitment devices, not cross-temporal entrenchments. But see
Kahn, 13 Hastings Const L Q at 188 (arguing that GRH is an impermissible cross-
temporal entrenchment).
The University of Chicago Law Review
such concurrent resolution."' Congress uses the reconciliation
process to enact revenue and direct spending laws that are
needed to meet the goals of the concurrent budget resolution.
Congressional budget resolutions, which are concurrent resolu-
tions without the force of law,45 reveal only Congress's macro-
budgetary goals; they provide aggregate figures, leaving to the
substantive committees the responsibility and the power to fill in
the details. For actual savings to occur in the entitlement or
revenue arenas, Congress must consider and pass reconciliation
legislation, which adjusts tax laws and mandatory spending to
accord with the instructions in the budget resolutions. Since the
mid-1980s, Congress has used omnibus reconciliation acts as the
legislative vehicles to implement the deficit reduction plans set
forth in the budget resolutions, including the 105th Congress's
legislation to balance the budget by 2002.46 Section 311(a) effec-
tively requires that any amendment to a reconciliation bill be
revenue neutral, thereby limiting the ability of members to
amend reconciliation legislation on the floor. Unlike PAYGO, the
offset cannot come from reducing entitlement spending. As with
reserve fund limitations, the Senate can waive this requirement
only by a three-fifths vote; Section 311(a) also applies to amend-
ments in the House, which can waive it in a special rule or by
majority vote.47
H. OFFSET REQUIREMENTS REDUCE TiE LEVEL OF NEW
FEDERAL SPENDING
The various pay-as-you-go rules reinforce the zero-sum char-
acter of modern budgeting as a tool to force legislators to reduce
the amount of new federal spending." More specifically with re-
" 2 USC § 642(aX) (1994).
See Floyd K. Riddick, Riddick's Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices 442
(GPO 1992) (defining concurrent resolutions).
See, for example, Balanced Budget Enforcement Act of 1997, HR 898, 105th Cong,
1st Sess (Feb 27, 1997).
' See Garrett, 45 U Kan L Rev at 1163 (cited in note 32) (detailing waiver by special
rule in the House). The House has waived budget points of order over six hundred times
since the 1974 Budget Act became effective. See also How Did We Get Here From There:
Reform of the Federal Budget Process, Hearings Before the House Committee on the
Budget, 104th Cong, 2d Sess 93 (1996) (prepared statement of Representative Charles W.
Stenholm).
4 PAYGO and other similar provisions directly affect only proposals for new tax ex-
penditures and new entitlement spending and thus appear to leave the status quo un-
changed. See Penner and Abramson, Broken Purse Strings at 33 (cited in note 23);
Wildavsky and Caiden, New Politics at 150 (cited in note 8). However, as I will explain in
Part I, an offset requirement indirectly causes review of existing provisions, as a by-
product of efforts to enact new programs.
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gard to tax legislation, offset requirements, and the interest
group competition they foster, increase the costs of enacting new
tax expenditures at the same time that they decrease the value of
tax subsidies. Ater we understand precisely how PAYGO and the
other rules work to reduce the amount of new federal spending
through the tax code (and in entitlement legislation), we will con-
sider the puzzle of why legislators implemented such a frame-
work.
A. PAYGO Increases the Cost of Enacting New
Tax Expenditures
Offset requirements force those seeking federal benefits to
undertake an additional role; not only are they funding seekers,
but they must also become funding predators.49 To receive fund-
ing for any new program, groups must first advocate eliminating
or reducing an existing one; they can no longer rely on deficit fi-
nancing to push the costs into the future. One straightforward
funding option is to raise money through higher tax rates. Con-
gress, however, rarely does this-at least not openly-because
lawmakers believe, with reason, that a decision to raise taxes will
hurt them at the polls." While the public may be generally inat-
tentive to lawmakers' actions in Washington, a challenger can
use higher taxes to rouse the inattentive on election day. The
Democrats and President Clinton learned this lesson in 1994
when the Republican Party and its candidates used the issue of
tax increases to capture the House and Senate." Furthermore, it
' I am grateful to AL Jones-Hartsough for this phrasing.
' See R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action 193-94 (Yale 1990) (noting
that "legislators fear electoral retribution" when they raise taxes, and that the fear is jus-
tifiable because direct taxes "impose perceptible costs on those who pay them; the costs
can be traced to identifiable governmental actions ... ; and legislators are required to take
public positions on most tax bills"). See also Schick, Capacity to Budget at 145 (cited in
note 23) (Even as early as 1980, Congress preferred to use "revenue enhancements" rather
than rate increases to meet deficit reduction targets.); Shapiro, Complexity in the Tax Leg-
islative Process at I-Jo32 (cited in note 14) ("[D]uring the 1980s. ... revenue increases
have been a large part of the overall deficit reduction.., because revenue increases in the
form of 'base broadeners,' "loophole closers,' user fees, or tax changes of limited applicabil-
ity have not been perceived by the general public as tax increases.").
" See Arnold, Logic of Congressional Action at 68-71 (discussing the concept of the in-
attentive public and the ability of challengers, political parties, or other entrepreneurs to
instigate action with respect to a policy that imposes direct burdens on it); David S. Bro-
der, Vote May Signal GOP Return as Dominant Party; Victors Push Beyond Solid South-
ern Base, Wash Post Al (Nov 10, 1994) ('The driving force for all the Republican gains...
was the voters' identification of Clinton and the Democratic Party with big government
and higher taxes. Try as he might to convince voters that he represented a different kind
of approach, the upper-bracket tax hike in his 1993 budget plan and the scope of his failed
health reform convinced people that Clinton was not the "New Democrat' he had sketched
1998]
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may have become more difficult to increase tax rates since the
1995 enactment of a House rule requiring a three-fifths vote to
pass such legislation.52
Congress thus seldom enacts blatant tax hikes. It is more
likely, instead, to pass less transparent forms of broad-based tax
increases. The beauty of bracket creep (from a lawmaker's per-
spective) was that it allowed taxes to increase without any con-
gressional action. It, along with deficit financing, provided law-
makers with fiscal illusions that masked both higher tax burdens
and legislators' responsibility for them. Members now use compli-
cated tax provisions, such as the overall limitation on itemized
deductions' or the phase-out of the personal exemption," to dis-
guise tax rate hikes and minimize negative voter reaction.
Because of the political taboo associated with tax increases,
the tax legislative process is presently dominated by the quest to
find a different sort of offset. This search significantly raises the
cost of obtaining a benefit. Although groups can approach Con-
gress for benefits without also presenting a way to pay for their
new spending, success is more likely if they have a revenue neu-
tral package.56 Moreover, if the benefit is proposed as an amend-
in his 1992 campaign speeches."); Donald Lambro, GOP Candidates Ride on Tax-Cut
Rhetoric; Economic Growth Rules Governor Races, Wash Times Al (Oct 7, 1994) ("Ac-
cording to polls, GOP candidates running on tax cute... were well ahead."). The 1993 Act
added a new marginal tax rate of 36 percent and a surtax on the rich that was essentially
a top marginal tax rate of 39.6 percent. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
("OBRA 1993") §§ 13201-02, Pub L No 103-66, 107 Stat 312, 457-61, codified at 26 USC § 1
(1994). Voters were unmoved by the fact that the higher rates affected only 1.4 million
taxpayers, Treasury Department, Estimated Distribution Across Congressional Districts of
Taxpayers Facing Higher Rates and Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients (1993), re-
printed in Tax Notes Today Doc 93-12955 (Dec 15, 1993), and by President Clinton's effort,
by creating a deficit reduction fund, to convince them that the revenues would go to deficit
reduction rather than new programs, Exec Order 12858 (Aug 4, 1993), in 3 CFR 626
(1994).
' Rule of the House XXI, cl 5(c), H Res 5, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 7, 1997), in 143
Cong Rec H 9 (Jan 7, 1997). See also note 43 (discussing constitutionality of such provi-
sions). This rule appears not to be a significant hurdle, however, because Congress can
easily waive it. See Skaggs v Carle, 110 F3d 831, 835 (DC Cir 1997) (listing at least four
times in the 104th Congress that the rule was waived by simple majority vote).
See Timothy J. Conlan, Margaret T. Wrightson, and David R. Beam, Taxing
Choices: The Politics of Tax Reform 19 (CQ 1990) (terming bracket creep as "a fiscal and
political gold mine" for legislators).
Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") § 68, codified at 26 USC § 68 (1994).
IRC § 151 (1994).
See, for example, Carol Matlack, Zap! You're Taxed, Natl J 267 (Feb 3, 1990) (dis-
cussing lobbyist (who is now the Chief of Staff of the Joint Tax Committee) who "knew
that his chances of prevailing [on a proposed tax expenditure] would be greatly enhanced
if he came up with a revenue-raising measure"); Joyce, 56 Pub Admin Rev at 321 (cited in
note 22) ("Since the BEA was enacted .... explicit assumptions of deficit neutrality
(PAYGO) halve] made the question, 'How will you pay for it? the first one asked of propo-
nents of costly new spending."). But see Matlack, Natl J at 269 (mentioning another lob-
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ment in committee or on the floor of Congress, an offset may be
required to meet the revenue neutrality requirements necessary
to avoid a point of order.57 Advocates therefore must invest re-
sources in identifying a promising offset. Some information about
possible targets is public and easily obtainable. For example, one
of the lasting consequences of the Budget Act is a requirement
that Congress and the executive branch produce lists of tax ex-
penditures with estimates of the revenue losses attributable to
them." Interest groups comb these lists, paying special attention
to upward revisions in revenue estimates."
byist who indicated that no member had asked him for an offset and questioned whether
such a process was consistent with "good public policy"). Supporters of tax benefits that
lose only a small amount of revenue need not produce offsets if they have strong advocates
on the tax writing committees. To ensure that members will support the chairman's bill in
committee, it is common practice to include in the mark a number of very targeted bene-
fits that are paid for by other revenue-raising provisions inserted by the committee lead-
ership. See Gene Steuerle, Whatever Happened to Equal Justice?, Tax Notes 119, 120
(July 7, 1997). The recently enacted Line Item Veto Act, which allows the President to
cancel targeted tax benefits, may undermine the ability of chairmen to offer such deals.
See Pub L No 104-130 § 1021(aX3), 110 Stat 1200 (1996), codified at 2 USCA § 691 (1997).
"' See, for example, Joan Pryde, Vandana Mathur, and Susan McInerney, Ways-Means
Continues Tax Markup, Defeats Wide Range of Amendments, Daily Tax Rep G-9, G-10 to
G-11 (June 13, 1997) (listing amendments offered in committee and the offsets that ac-
companied them). See also id (describing the failure of a politically popular amendment to
eliminate the real estate depreciation recapture provision because it was paired with an
unpopular revenue-raiser, the elimination of the proposed reduction in the corporate capi-
tal gains rate).
" See, for example, Budget Act § 308, codified as amended at 2 USC § 639; Budget of
the United States Government for Fiscal Year 1998, Analytical Perspectives, H Doc 105-
003, 105th Cong, 1st Sess, ch 5 (1997); Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal
Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1997-2001 (Nov 26, 1996); Senate Committee on the
Budget, Tax Expenditures: Compendium of Background Materials on Individual Provi-
sions, 104th Cong, 2d Sess, S Prt 104-69 (GPO 1996).
' See Martin A. Sullivan, Budget Reveals Significant Changes in Tax Expenditure Es-
timates, Tax Notes 1473 (Mar 17, 1997) ("In the calculus of budget politics, the benefits of
repeal (i.e., the estimated revenue saving that may be available for other programs) have
increased while the political costs (the opposition of interest groups) remain the same.
Conversely, a lower tax expenditure estimate diminishes the likelihood of its repeal.").
Sullivan's observation is only half right in many instances; if the existing tax provision
provides a more valuable benefit, perhaps because tax rates have increased, then the
strength of the opposition to its elimination may well be greater. If the revenue estimate
has changed only because the estimators have better information, then his statement that
the political cost remains the same is accurate. The importance of these estimates to in-
terest groups' strategies with regard to offsets underscores the political importance of the
technical staff in the legislative and executive branches. Commentators should pay more
attention to the staffs' role in the formulation of tax policy and to the politicization of su-
perficially neutral decisions. See Linda A. Schwartzstein, Smoke and Mirrors: Tax Legis-
lation, Uncertainty and Entrepreneurship, 6 Cornell J L & Pub Pol 61, 77-83 (1997) (dis-
cussing method and limitations of revenue estimating); Garrett, 45 U Kan L Rev at 1162 n
211 (cited in note 32) (discussing importance of the CBO's role in another part of the
budget process, the application of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act); Michael J. Graetz,
Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 Colum L Rev 609, 681-82 (1995) (discussing evi-
dence that distributional tables produced by Joint Committee on Tax and Treasury are
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Other political actors also produce sources for offsets. The
Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") publishes an annual report,
Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options;' admini-
stration officials sometimes release (or leak) documents that con-
tain suggestions for changes to the tax code that will raise
money.6' Public interest organizations and think tanks also pro-
duce documents that can be scoured for offsets,62 and boutique
Washington firms specialize in identifying and drafting suitable
offsets for those seeking new tax subsidies.' Groups may publi-
cize negative aspects of tax subsidies that benefit their competi-
tors either to level the playing field or to gain a competitive ad-
vantage. Of course, not all the provisions found through such
sources will serve as offsets. The tax expenditures that represent
the greatest revenue loss for the federal government are virtually
untouchable: the home mortgage interest deduction, preferential
treatment for retirement savings and employer-provided health
benefits, and the stepped-up basis of capital assets at death."
driven by politics rather than economic science); Michael D. Bopp, The Roles of Revenue
Estimation and Scoring in the Federal Budget Process, Tax Notes 1629 (Sept 21, 1992)
(discussing increasing political pressures on revenue estimators since PAYGO's passage).
See also Shuman, Politics and the Budget at 284 (cited in note 9) (recounting CBO Direc-
tor Penner's criticism that GRH gave "an excessive amount of power to appointed officials
such as himself").
IFor the latest report, see Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options (CBO
1997). See also Lawrence J. Haas, Protection Squad, Natl J 1270, 1273-74 (May 26, 1990)
(discussing role of Joint Tax staff in suggesting options); Harold R. Handler, Budget Rec-
onciliation and the Tax Law: Legislative History or Legislative Hysteria?, Tax Notes 1259,
1266 (Dec 21, 1987) (same).
"1 See, for example, Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 1997, Ana-
lytical Perspectives ch 3 (GPO 1996); Message from the President about his Budget Propos-
als, H Doc 104-160, pt 1, 104th Cong, 2d Sess 10-12 (1996) (containing revenue estimates);
Draft Memorandum Prepared by Alice Rivlin, Director of Office of Management and
Budget, on Options for Administration's FY 1996 Budget, Dated Oct. 3, 1994, Daily Tax
Rep L-1 (Oct 25, 1994).
See, for example, Dean Stansel and Stephen Moore, Briefing Paper, Federal Aid to
Dependent Corporations: Clinton and Congress Fail to Eliminate Business Subsidies
(Cato, May 1, 1997); Robert J. Shapiro and Chris J. Soares, Cut and Invest to Grow: How
to Expand Public Investment While Cutting the Deficit (Progressive Policy 1997); Tax
Loopholes From A to Z: The Comprehensive Compendium (Citizens for Tax Justice, May 2,
1996).
See, for example, Letter from Alvin Brown, Tax Legislative Services, to Dan Web-
ber, Legislative Director to Senator David L. Boren (Aug 15, 1992) (on file with U Chi L
Rev) ("I like to draft compliance rules and legislation that close tax loopholes.... If Sena-
tor Boren would like to help a constituent who wants a floor amendment to H.R. 11 (a tax
bill vetoed by President Bush], and you cannot get the assistance you need from Finance
staff or Joint Tax, I have an inventory of some quality virgin (never used) 'raisers.'... I
love doing the raisers as a matter of principle, and I would enjoy being of some help to any
of your constituents.").
"See Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 1998, 2 H Doc 105-003 at
79 table 5-3 (cited in note 58) (listing major tax expenditures in the income tax ranked by
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Selecting an appropriate offset from these sources involves
several determinations; one of the most important is whether
other interest groups will strongly defend the potential offset.
One way to avoid vigorous opposition is to choose a provision that
benefits the relatively needy, rather than an expenditure that
benefits organized and wealthy economic interests.' The former
are likely to be more dispersed and less able to organize; even if
members do mount some opposition, a well-financed funding
predator may more likely prevail against such groups than if it
targets a provision defended by organized and wealthy benefici-
aries.
Again, however, several political realities limit the availabil-
ity of this offset strategy. First, such tax provisions, sometimes
called need-based provisions," have their supporters in and out of
Congress. Because of their ideological commitments or a desire to
influence public policy, lawmakers or party activists sometimes
act as policy entrepreneurs, representing the interests of the un-
organized or disadvantaged. Professors Schlozman and Tierney
define a policy entrepreneur as someone "who, through adroit use
of the media, can mobilize public support by appealing to widely
shared values such as a concern about health, safety, or environ-
mental preservation and by making opponents seem self-serving
and careless of the public interest."7 Moreover, even though
smaller groups are more likely to organize in an attempt to influ-
ence the government," groups representing large numbers of per-
sons concerned with issues of broad importance do form and work
to influence federal policy.69 Therefore, those seeking a new pro-
total revenue loss).
' See, for example, Graham K Wilson, Interest Groups 75 (Basil Blackwell 1990)
("The budget cuts of 1981 were shaped in such a way as to impose the greatest burdens on
those, such as the poor, with the least political power and to avoid interests, such as the
elderly or aircraft manufacturers, with strong interest groups.").
" John F. Witte, in his excellent analysis of tax expenditures, classifies them as falling
into the first of his five categories: need-based; tax equity; special group; general economic;
and specific economic. John F. Witte, The Politics and Development of the Federal Income
Tax 273-75 (Wisconsin 1985).
Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American
Democracy 84 (Harper & Row 1986). See also id at 402 (stating that the poorly repre-
sented in the pressure community receive attention because of policy entrepreneurs);
Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Proc-
ess as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U Pa L Rev 1, 93-94 (1990) (dis-
cussing the role of policy entrepreneurs in the enactment of the 1986 Tax Reform Act). But
see Garrett, 81 Cornell L Rev at 660-62 (cited in note 7) (unpacking varied motivations of
legislators).
£ See generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the
Theory of Groups (Harvard 1965).
*6 See Schlozman and Tierney, Organized Interests at 74 (noting that one of the most
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gram cannot be guaranteed that a need-based offset will produce
inadequate opposition.
Second, distributional concerns operate to provide some level
of protection for current provisions that benefit lower-income
Americans. In addition to imposing the norm of revenue neutral-
ity on the Tax Reform Act of 1986, drafters agreed that the bill
should be distributionally neutral as well.7° In other words, the
bill should not change the relative tax burden borne by the vari-
ous income classes of individual taxpayers. Recent significant tax
laws, the reconciliation bills of 1990 and 1993, were designed to
be progressive in their distributional effects, a goal that power-
fully protected need-based provisions.7' Although such distribu-
tional constraints are not formally binding through.any budget
rule or procedure, legislators know that distributional effects are
politically important. They do not draft modern tax bills without
considering them. Regardless of which party is in the majority, no
Congress is likely to eliminate or reduce provisions that benefit
lower-income taxpayers in order to provide tax expenditures for
businesses or higher-income Americans. Even in the debate over
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, a bill not characterized by a con-
cern about progressivity, distributional concerns were still dis-
cussed prominently.72 However, because changes in entitlement
important changes in Washington politics since the mid-1960s has been the emergence of
"many new groups-ranging from Common Cause and Ralph Nader's Public Citizen to the
National Urban Coalition and the Migrant Legal Action Project-representing broad pub-
lics and the less advantaged"); Wilson, Interest Groups at 49-50 (cited in note 65) (noting
that since the 1970s, "a wide range of interest groups had developed representing pre-
cisely those interests which political scientists had predicted would be the most difficult to
organize"). See also Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace
the Myth of Self-Rule with an Attorneyship Model of Representation, 69 NYU L Rev 477,
535 (1994) (discussing the role of legislators in representing interests that might not be
heard in the political process and describing it as a sort of "best-world model of represen-
tation").
20 Michael J. Graetz, The Truth About Tax Reform, 40 U Fla L Rev 617, 624-25 (1988).
Graetz, 95 Colum L Rev at 612 (cited in note 59).
See J.D. Foster, Income and the Art of Tax Distribution Analysis, Tax Found Extra
Point 1 (Aug 1, 1997); Clay Chandler, The Tax Gap, Wash Post 13 (July 14, 1997) (weekly
ed) (Secretary Rubin criticized Republican bills as unfair because insufficiently progres-
sive.); John Godfrey, Night and Day: GOP, Dems Fight Over Distribution Tables, Tax
Notes 10 (July 7, 1997). The importance of distributional analysis in the modern tax leg-
islative process was underscored when the Joint Tax Committee released a description
and defense of its methodology. Joint Committee on Taxation, Methodology and Issues in
Measuring Changes in the Distribution of Tax Burdens (GPO 1993). See also Godfrey, Tax
Notes at 10 (noting that the Joint Tax Committee recently changed the measure of income
used for distributional tables, a move some characterize as politically driven). See gener-
ally David F. Bradford, ed, Distributional Analysis of Tax Policy (AEI 1995). Compare
Vandana Mathur, Hill Proposals to Use Budget Surplus for Tax Cuts Called 'Regressive"
by Raines, Daily Tax Rep G-2 (Sept 16, 1997) (OMB Director attacking on distributional
grounds a proposal to use budget surplus for tax cuts.).
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programs are not included in distributional tables prepared by
the Joint Tax Committee or Treasury, need-based entitlement
programs may not enjoy the political insulation afforded by the
preoccupation with distributional effects. Need-based entitlement
programs therefore may be more likely targets for offsets than
similar need-based programs implemented through the tax code.
If political considerations largely rule out increasing tax
rates or reducing need-based tax expenditures, advocates of new
provisions must resort to targeting other tax expenditures, which
are often supported by other organized groups." Where conflict
ensues, the group protecting the existing tax expenditure is likely
to defeat the group proposing it as an offset, even if the latter has
worked diligently to find a provision supported by a relatively
less powerful or less well-organized group.
First, it can be difficult to discover which and how many in-
terest groups are concerned about a particular benefit, so an off-
set proposal may provoke unexpectedly strong opposition. Not
only are taxpayers who directly claim the tax expenditure likely
to object to its reduction or repeal, but service providers or re-
lated industries may also emerge as powerful opponents. As Pro-
fessor Howard observes generally: "[Tiax expenditures rely al-
most exclusively on third parties in the private sector for service
delivery [that] expands the number of beneficiaries and strength-
ens the base of interest-group support for each program. 4 For
example, perhaps the most vociferous supporters of the targeted
jobs tax credit75 were not the disadvantaged groups covered by
the provision nor the businesses that claimed the credit. Rather,
the firms that helped employers determine which employees
qualified for the tax credit and complete the necessary tax
forms-an industry that would not have existed without the gov-
They can also use accounting gimmicks to speed up the collection of revenue that
will be paid under current law so that more money is raised in the budget window. Many
predators have relied on timing changes, such as changes in the estimated tax laws, to pay
for new tax benefits. See text accompanying notes 97-102. To the extent that tax deferral
is valuable for taxpayers, however, requiring them to pay earlier imposes a burden on
them. Thus, the analysis of accounting changes is similar to the analysis in the text. If the
timing change affects the diffuse group of all taxpayers, then it is a disguised tax rate hike
and will be a popular strategy for predators. If the proposed speed-up affects an identifi-
able group of taxpayers, they will employ the same kind of defensive strategies that I de-
scribe later.
7 Christopher Howard, Testing the Tools Approach: Tax Expenditures Versus Direct
Expenditures, 55 Pub Admin Rev 439, 441 (1995). See Burdett A. Loomis and Allan J. Ci-
gler, Introduction: The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics, in Allan J. Cigler and
Burdett A. Loomis, eds, Interest Group Politics 1, 12 (CQ 3d ed 1991).
7S IRC § 51 (created in 1978, expired at the end of 1994, and replaced with the work
opportunity tax credit).
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ernment program7 -- were among the most effective lobbyists pro-
tecting the credit from elimination.
Second, even if groups seeking to enact a new tax provision
precisely target a weak prey, the groups defending the existing
provision are in a better position to win. In many cases, those ad-
vocating new benefits may be recently organized groups (or fewer
groups because service providers will not yet exist) with less clout
and experience than established groups that have enjoyed bene-
fits for years. As Robert Reischauer, then Director of the CBO,
put it:
[E]xisting programs have one heck of a lot more political
support than a program that is a promise in the future. It
doesn't have all its interest groups set up yet. It doesn't have
a whole set of beneficiaries out there salivating. And so it's a
little hard to mobilize the yet-to-be beneficiaries of a pro-
gram to come and lobby you as opposed to the existing ones
who have their offices on K Street.77
Ironically, one of the effects of this dynamic is that current bene-
ficiaries of federal programs are in a better position to gain even
more benefits. They already have organized and developed exper-
tise in lobbying the relevant committees. As we will see,78 in a
world of offset requirements, those who receive tax subsidies
must remain organized in order to fend off attacks from new
funding predators. An organized, established group is more likely
to seek new programs than a latent group that must bear the
significant start-up costs of organization. 79 The marginal costs to
the former group of agitating for new or increased benefits are
much less; thus, the burden of PAYGO is not uniform across
groups. This difference may further entrench status quo alloca-
tions of government resources.
Third, even if the new program is supported by an estab-
lished group or coalition, it is generally easier to oppose legisla-
tive change than to enact it. The Constitution establishes several
76 Howard, 55 Pub Admin Rev at 445 (cited in note 74).
Hearing on a Midcourse Review of the Budget Enforcement Act before the House
Budget Committee's Task Force on Budget Process, Reconciliation, and Enforcement, 102d
Cong, 1st Sess (Oct 10, 1991). See also Truman, Governmental Process at 353 (cited in
note 7); Michael T. Hayes, Lobbyists and Legislators: A Theory of Political Markets 76
(Rutgers 1981).
See Part H.C.
See Robert E. McCormick and Robert D. Tollison, Politicians, Legislation, and the
Economy: An Inquiry Into the Interest-Group Theory of Government 17 (Martinus Nijhoff
1981) ("Groups that have already borne these start-up costs, for reasons unrelated to lob-
bying, will have a comparative advantage in seeking transfers [from the government] and
will therefore be more successful in procuring transfers as a result.").
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impediments to legislative change, such as bicameralism and the
presentment requirement, and the Senate and the House have
adopted additional hurdles that operate to protect the status
quo."° Groups defending an existing tax provision need to prevail
at only one stage in the convoluted legislative process. Propo-
nents of the new provision, on the other hand, must successfully
navigate all the obstacles. To protect themselves, targets can con-
centrate on one of the two tax writing committees, or even a few
members of the Senate Finance Committee (where the majority
party often barely has more seats than the minority), to ensure
that the offensive provisions are not included in the mark. Alter-
natively, they can focus on the administration for help; for exam-
ple, Ways and Means Chairman Archer's plan to raise billions of
dollars by eliminating tax subsidies for ethanol foundered when
the Clinton Administration announced strong opposition."1 Once
the offset appears in the mark, informal committee norms may
require the targeted beneficiaries to find their own offset and to
present a revenue neutral amendment in order to strike the of-
fending provision. 2 But if the prey loses at one stage in the pro-
cess, it can move on to another." Winning may be more difficult
after early losses, but it is still possible; in contrast, a predator
must win at each stage.
See Bruce Ian Oppenheimer, Oil and the Congressional Process: The Limits of Sym-
bolic Politics 65 (DC Health 1974) ("The defending side in the legislative process has a
major advantage over the initiating side. Prime among these is... the 'serial' nature of
the legislative process.... [T]he proponent side in the legislative struggle needs to build a
winning coalition at each of the many decision making points in the process. The oppo-
nents, however, often need only to win at one decision making point to delay, if not defeat,
a legislative proposal."). See also Schlozman and Tierney, Organized Interests at 314-15
(cited in note 67).
' See Richard W. Stevenson, Pressured, House Chairman Modifies Tax Plan, NY
Times B16 (June 12, 1997). Archer's proposal was significantly scaled back in the Senate
version and eliminated by the conference committee (where the admini tration played a
large role).
A motion merely to strike a provision on the floor of the Senate, however, is not cov-
ered by the rule that amendments to reconciliation bills be deficit-neutral. See Budget Act
§ 310(dX2) (stating that "a motion to strike a provision shall always be in order"). But such
an amendment (without an offset) might be vulnerable to a point of order under Budget
Act § 311(a), which states that an amendment that causes revenues to fall below the level
set forth in the budget resolution shall be out of order. And the point of order can be
waived only by a three-fifths vote in the Senate. GRH § 271(b).
' See Barbara Bradley, Tax Cut Lobbying Fever, Natl Public Radio, Morning Edition,
Transcript # 970613090-210 (June 13, 1997) (describing efforts of real estate lobby to de-
feat a recapture provision; after losing in the Ways and Means Committee, "realtors, like
many other interest groups, have moved to the other side of the Capitol to pay visits to
members of the Senate Finance Committee").
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Fourth, prospect theory suggests that groups will work
harder to avoid a loss than to gain a benefit." Leaders of interest
groups confirm this, reporting that they can more easily mobilize
members to ward off an attack than to mount one." In part to re-
duce the chance that other groups will feel threatened, funding
predators may try to portray their offset proposal as affecting the
same groups of taxpayers that would benefit from the new tax
subsidy. For example, the 1993 repeal of the luxury tax on boats
was offset in part by a tax on diesel fuel used in noncommercial
boats," and supporters argued that they were paying for their
own proposal. If such a characterization is accurate (or is per-
ceived as accurate), then little or no opposing interest group pres-
sure will arise. The problem is that many such characterizations
are misleading. For example, the group benefiting from the lux-
ury tax repeal (purchasers and manufacturers of expensive boats)
is not entirely congruent with the group paying for the new ex-
penditure (all owners of noncommercial boats who must pay
higher fuel prices).
In addition to these costs caused by opposition from target
groups, PAYGO also imposes several other costs on groups seek-
ing new tax subsidies. First, even if a group finds a weakly de-
fended target to use as an offset, it has no enforceable property
rights in its discovery."7 It must be prepared to defend the offset
against other predators who might seek to use it to pay for their
own new benefits. The system provides no official enforcement
mechanism to link a proposed program with the particular offset
See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law,
64 U Chi L Rev 1175, 1179-81 (1997); Arnold, Logic of Congressional Action at 32 (cited in
note 50) (applying prospect theory to interest group activity with regard to federal bene-
fits). See also W. Mark Crain and Nicole Verrier Crain, Fiscal Consequences of Budget
Baselines 5-7 (1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with U Chi L Rev) (applying prospect
theory to related context of budget baselines).
See James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations 309 (Basic 1973).
OBRA 1993 §§ 13161, 13163, 107 Stat at 449-53. The diesel fuel tax was repealed in
the 1997 bill, Taxpayer Relief Act § 902, 111 Stat at 873, but there was neither any dis-
cussion of the quid pro quo nature of its enactment nor any suggestion that the price of
the excise tax repeal should be reinstatement of the luxury tax on boats. Of course, most
offsets cannot be reasonably characterized as burdening only those who benefit from the
new programs. See, for example, Lauren Darling and Sindhu G. Hirani, Two Items in
Senate Version of Budget Bill Seen Hurting Some Taxpayers, Daily Tax Rep G-9, G-10
(Nov 7, 1995) (discussing proposed increase in the deduction for business meals and enter-
tainment and its offset, which would have repealed Section 1215(cX5) of the 1986 Tax Re-
form Act treating Ford Motor Credit as a financial institution for purposes of allocating in-
terest expenses).
See Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J L Econ
& Org 213, 227 (1990) (noting that there are no guaranteed property rights in political ar-
rangements).
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its advocates identify. For example, during the drafting of HR 11,
a tax bill vetoed by President Bush, many interest groups re-
vealed their offsets so that their benefits could be included. In the
next tax bill," some of the revenue offsets were included in the
chairmen's marks-but without the revenue-losing provisions to
which they had been linked. In some cases, the original predator
was still able to win its new tax subsidy because a pivotal legisla-
tor had the clout to require the recoupling in the final legisla-
tion.89 In other words, members of Congress can stabilize the
rather ephemeral claims predators might have to particular tar-
gets. But in the absence of assistance from legislators with lever-
age, advocates are at risk of losing their investment in developing
an offset proposal. Thus, the conflict relevant to my analysis is
not limited to the two-way opposition between predator and prey;
often many predators circle a promising offset and fight for its
revenue. Members of Congress also can be predators because they
need to find revenue to pay for tax breaks that they promise their
constituents.' ° All proponents of new programs face these costs,
even those who are fortunate enough to find an offset that is not
well defended.
PAYGO imposes on predators a second substantial cost that
is entirely unrelated to the nature of the target. Current budget
procedures make revenue estimates increasingly salient; they
play a large role in determining whether a provision can be en-
acted, as well as whether an existing provision is a promising off-
set. This translates into a heightened awareness of the cost of
new tax expenditures, or at least of the revenue loss within the
OBRA 1993, 107 Stat at 457.
U For example, in HR 11, the restaurant industry had proposed to pay for a credit for
the portion of employer social security taxes paid on employee cash tips by eliminating the
deduction under 111 § 162 allowed to individuals for the payment of club dues. The House
version of OBRA 1993 included the disallowance of the club dues deduction, but it did not
include the credit for FICA taxes on tips. Because the restaurant industry had a strong
ally on the Finance Committee, they were able to recouple the provisions in the final bill.
See OBRA 1993 §§ 13210, 13443, 107 Stat at 469, 568. See also Alissa J. Rubin, Congress'
Offset Bind, CQ 1452 (May 25, 1996) (noting that Congress had used several offsets in
more than one bill because it was so difficult to find enough revenue to pay for tax bills).
" See, for example, Helen Dewar, Jumping Aboard the Tax Cut Bandwagon, Wash
Post 13, 14 (July 7, 1997) (weekly ed) (Proponents of subsidies for children's health insur-
ance (a direct spending program) used as an offset part of the revenue raised by a ciga-
rette tax, which others on the Finance Committee "had been planning to use for things
like relief for real estate interests."); Martin A. Sullivan, Business Versus Business at
Ways and Means Markup, Tax Notes 1447, 144748 (June 16, 1997) (noting the surprise of
many that Chairman Archer used revenue-raisers proposed the year before in the admini-
stration's attack on "corporate welfare," but concluding that, "Archer probably made the
judgment that sooner or later those revenue-raisers were going to be used by somebody,
and so he might as well be the one.").
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budget window for which estimates are provided."' At the same
time, this system weakens the fiscal illusion engendered by defi-
cit spending or bracket creep that spending programs are cost-
free.2 In this climate, new federal programs are more difficult to
enact. The ability to manipulate revenue estimates, however, al-
lows proponents to mask a great deal of the revenue loss during
the early years-a strategy that is also attractive because it re-
duces the amount of revenue needed for neutrality. It is to such
gimmicks and other ways to avoid the costs of the PAYGO system
that we now turn our attention.
B. Gimmicks and Downstreaming: Avoiding the High Costs
of PAYGO
The existence of cheaper ways for interest groups to avoid
offset requirements decreases the success of PAYGO and similar
budget rules at reducing the number of new programs, exploiting
interest group conflict, and highlighting the opportunity costs of
funding decisions. Several such means of evasion exist, under-
mining PAYGO's discipline somewhat but not entirely. It is worth
identifying and assessing some of them here in order to give a
fuller picture of the dynamic effect of budget rules on the legisla-
tive process and other parts of the federal government.93
" Revenue estimates do not completely or accurately indicate the revenue loss of new
tax provisions, because the models that estimators use do not fully account for macroeco-
nomic effects. Revenue estimates are sometimes described as "static" by critics, but they
do include first-order behavioral responses (that is, changes in the activity level of the be-
havior that the tax provision directly affects). The Joint Committee on Taxation does not
take into account macroeconomic effects, such as changes in total employment, growth in
income, and other feedback effects. See Review of Congressional Budget Cost Estimating,
Joint Hearing Before the House Committee on the Budget and the Senate Committee on
the Budget, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 20-22 (GPO 1995) (written testimony of Kenneth A.
Kies, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation). In the same hearing, former CBO Di-
rector Reischauer discussed the advantages and disadvantages of including a broader
range of macroeconomic effects in revenue estimates. See id at 27-31. For discussions con-
cerning the possibility of adopting more dynamic estimating techniques, see Jane G.
Gravelle, Dynamic Revenue Estimating (CRS Rep for Congress, Dec 14, 1994) (concluding
that including cyclical effects, like price effects, would produce inaccurate estimates and
that because of the short budget window, including permanent effects would change esti-
mates very little); Graetz, 95 Colum L Rev at 668-77 (cited in note 59).
9 See Shaviro, 139 U Pa L Rev at 59 (cited in note 67) (stating that in part because of
fiscal illusions, "the demand for public goods depends on how they are financed, instead of
being a function merely of benefit versus cost"). See also D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew
D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation 81 (Chicago 1991) (calling such procedures "heris-
thetic[s]" or "parliamentary stratagems that seek to change the outcomes of congressional
decisions by changing perceptions about what they mean"). But see Wildavsky and
Caiden, New Politics at 134 (cited in note 8) (calling the requirement of offsets "IeInforcing
the notion of opportunity costs in budgeting").
"Because I want to give only a flavor of these gimmicks, my discussion is not exhaus-
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1. Timing gimmicks that manipulate the limited
budget window.
Budget rules require proponents of new tax breaks to offset
revenue loss within a truncated budget window; PAYGO's win-
dow is five fiscal years, and that of most recent reserve funds is
ten fiscal years. Moreover, despite much academic criticism," the
cost of programs is considered on a cash flow, rather than present
value, basis.95 Such a perspective means that revenue-outflows
beyond the window need not be offset-neither at the time of en-
actment nor at the time the revenue losses occur. As a result,
delaying revenue loss until the "out-years" is not an uncommon
strategy for advocates of new programs. Indeed, one reason the
Senate has occasionally extended the window to ten years has
been to discourage such behavior, although the staff of the Joint
Tax Committee warned members of Congress that "doing [ten
year] estimates would have a significant adverse impact on our
ability to produce timely estimates.'a
tive. See, for example, OMB Mid-Session Review, Hearing of the House Budget Commit-
tee, 102d Cong, 1st Sess (July 17, 1991) (statement of Richard Darman, Director of OMB)
("While the discipline of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 is being adhered to, it is
not... without considerable challenge. There is probably no limit to the potential inven-
tiveness of those who would wish to escape from the increasingly binding discipline."). For
example, Laurence Kotlikoff convincingly argues that cash-flow measurements can be un-
dermined by relabeling programs so they are accounted for differently. One can transform
a transfer payment into a repayment of capital if the tax the recipient pays in early years
is labeled a "loan" and the benefit, a "repayment." See Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Generational
Accounting: Knowing Who Pays, and When, for What We Spend 148-61 (Free Press 1992).
In many cases, a repayment is not scored as a revenue loss. Another interesting gimmick
that relies on timing is the repeal of a tax on the distribution of capital that is scored as
raising revenue because it reduces the lock-in effect and encourages taxpayers to realize
gain earlier. Although the most well-known example is the reduction in capital gains rates
(a provision discussed in text accompanying note 100), the repeal of the tax on excess dis-
tributions from qualified pension plans is a particularly interesting example of this budget
trick. The repeal in Section 1073 of the 1997 tax bill is estimated to raise $62 million over
ten years; Congress had previously passed a five year moratorium on the tax, which also
raised money. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 § 1452, Pub L No 104-188,
110 Stat 1755, 1816. Perhaps the only strange thing is that the 105th Congress perma-
nently repealed the tax, rather than just extending the moratorium for another five or six
years, as had been the common practice.
"See, for example, Jane G. Gravelle, Estimating Long-Run Revenue Effects of Tax
Law Changes, 19 E Econ J 481 (1993). See also Daniel Shaviro, Do Deficits Matter? 104-05
(Chicago 1997) (criticizing cash-flow measurements of the federal deficit for purposes of
the Balanced Budget Amendment).
" The limited exception is discretionary credit programs, which since 1990 have been
displayed in the budget on a net present value basis rather than as federal outlays occur.
See Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, Title XIH § 13201(a), Pub L No 101-508, 104 Stat
1388-1609, codified at 2 USC § 661 (1994).
" Latter from Peter v.Z. Cobb to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Chairman, Com-
mittee on Finance (Mar 23, 1994) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
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It seems likely that there is often a timing mismatch between
a new tax proposal and its offset. One would not be surprised to
find that many new tax expenditures tend to cost more money
over time. At the same time, many offsets may not be strongly
supported because they will provide less generous benefits in the
future. This long-term asymmetry in the benefit streams may not
be apparent within a limited budget window. More significantly
for our analysis, however, interest groups can exacerbate this dis-
tortion by drafting new federal programs so that most of the
revenue loss occurs in the out-years and by constructing offsets so
that their proposal raises money quickly.
Timing games and accounting tricks are common throughout
the federal budget arena: pay dates shift from one year to an-
other; changes in estimated tax provisions speed up the receipt of
revenue so that it falls within the budget window; and sales of
capital assets provide money for new programs. For example, the
recently enacted Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 results in much
higher revenue losses outside the five year PAYGO window than
within it.97 Only 34 percent of the ten year net tax cut occurs in
the first five years; accordingly, Congress was not required to off-
set two-thirds of the $292 billion tax reduction.98 The law includes
several strategically drafted provisions. A back-loaded individual
retirement account ("IRA"), called the Roth IRA, loses only $1.8
billion during the five year PAYGO window, but loses more than
$20.2 billion over ten years.99 The capital gains provision, which
The fiscal year 1998 budget resolution contained no reserve funds for tax legislation,
so Congress did not face any sanction for failing to achieve ten year revenue neutrality.
The relevant enforcement provision is the PAYGO sequester that applies to the effects of
legislation only through fiscal year 2002.
' See Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of the Conference
Agreement on the Revenue Provisions of H.R. 2014, The 'Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997," Fis-
cal Years 1997-2007 JCX-39-97 (July 30, 1997). See also Iris J. Lay and Robert Green-
stein, The Tax Cuts in the Budget Agreement: Phase-ins, Backloading, and Revenue Accel-
eration Lock in Very Large Future Costs (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 1997)
(studying the original package and finding revenue losses of $650 billion in the second ten
years after enactment); Martin A. Sullivan, Tax Facts, Tax Notes 885 (Aug 18, 1997)
(noting that capital gains and IRA relief more than doubles in the second five years and
estate tax relief quadruples in that period); Gene Steuerle, How Fast Do Revenue Losses
Accelerate?, Tax Notes 1669-70 (June 23, 1997) (detailing the profile of revenue loss for
major provisions of the tax agreement and discussing feasibility of "long-term, fully-
phased in" estimates). See also Martin A. Sullivan, 2002: A Budget Odyssey, Tax Notes
872-75 (Aug 18, 1997) (detailing the way that the current budget bill bunches revenue
gain in 2002 so that the budget will be balanced on schedule); Ryan J. Donmoyer and
Eben Halberstam, House Bill's Tax Expenditures Vary Dramatically in Long-Term Impact,
Tax Notes 807 (Nov 13, 1995) (finding similar revenue loss pattern in the House tax bill
proposed in the 104th Congress).
' Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects. A backloaded IRA differs
from current IRAs in that contributions are not deductible, but withdrawals are tax-
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is projected to raise $123 million in the first five years as lower
tax rates spur more sales, causes a revenue loss of nearly $21 bil-
lion in the second five years."°° Other proposals are phased in over
very long periods so that revenue loss is delayed until later years;
for example, the original House provision to increase the exemp-
tion for the estate tax was phased in over seventeen years.'0 ' The
final bill phased in the increased exemption over nine years and
delayed indexing until 1999, again skewing the revenue loss so
that only 18 percent of the ten year total falls in the first five
years. 0
2
The multitude of these provisions is not surprising; moder-
ately wily drafters can write provisions with the same present
value for taxpayers (setting aside the risk of repeal I discuss be-
low) in ways that have very different cash-flow effects. As Profes-
sor Graetz has observed:
[Clash-flow "budget window" revenue estimates greatly in-
fluence the design of tax provisions. For example, the close
relationship between investment tax credits, expensing of
assets, and accelerated depreciation is well known in the tax
policy literature. Reasonably sophisticated analysts, for ex-
ample, can construct proposals for accelerating depreciation,
partial expensing of assets' costs, or investment tax credits
that are equivalent tax reductions in terms of their present
value, but thatinvolve quite different timing of the tax re-
ductions and therefore have very different impacts on annual
revenue estimates during a budget period.' 3
This reality might lead one to conclude that PAYGO and offset
requirements that use cash-flow accounting are meaningless ex-
cept to the extent that they distort and complicate tax expendi-
tures. It might support a change to present value calculations, at
least as an additional check on the process. But timing gimmicks
cannot entirely eliminate the effect of PAYGO and related budget
rules; practical political considerations make it difficult to con-
exempt.
" Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects (cited in note 98).
"'See Joan Pryde and Susan McInerney, Archer Scales Back AMT Repeal; White
House Seeks Compromise in Senate, Daily Tax Rep GG-1 (June 12, 1997) (noting that
Chairman Archer ultimately shortened the phase-in period to ten years, rather than sev-
enteen). See also Sullivan, Tax Notes at 1449 (cited in note 90) ("Thirteen provisions in
the [Ways and Means] chairman's mark have revenue costs in the last five years that are
more than three times their cost in the first five years.").
1
" Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects (cited in note 98).
' Graetz, 95 Colum L Rev at 673 (cited in note 59), citing Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Accel-
erated Capital Recovery, Debt, and Tax Arbitrage, 38 Tax Law 549, 549-50 (1985).
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struct a tax provision with delayed benefits so large that they
equal (in present value terms) benefits that could be enjoyed ear-
lier. The nature of the legislative process inherently impairs the
ability of legislators to make credible promises of durability to in-
terest groups,104 and the requirement of offsets increases the dan-
ger that one's benefits will be tempting targets to pay for new
provisions.105 Strategically drafted provisions that delay the major
portion of the tax expenditure's benefit are at risk of being used
in early years as offsets because baseline budgeting conventions
score such repeals as raising revenue, even if the provisions have
never gone into effect. Groups therefore cannot be sure that a tax
expenditure with delayed benefits will remain in effect long
enough for them to enjoy the subsidy.
As a result of this uncertainty, interest groups may use very
high discount rates when determining the present value of back-
loaded or phased-in benefits, and they are less likely to seek such
tax programs (and less likely to reward handsomely legislators
who sponsor them). For example, a Republican proposal in the
104th Congress would have allowed businesses very favorable
depreciation rules in present value terms, but it would have pro-
vided most of the benefit several years after enactment.' The
business community did not enthusiastically support the pro-
posal, in part, I think, because it was not convinced that any new
provision would remain in effect long enough for businesses to
enjoy. In addition, interest groups may be worried that the rather
complicated language necessary to implement delayed benefits
will be sufficiently opaque to include numerous traps for the un-
wary or provisions that undermine the drafters' promises.
2. Downstreaming decisions to the executive branch.
A less well-known way around offset requirements occurs
when interest groups, sometimes with the help of Congress, in-
fluence the executive branch to implement spending programs
through regulations, a process I call "downstreaming." The phe-
nomenon of regulations substituting for legislation has long been
recognized.0 7 Congress is not the only tax lawmaking arena in
4 See text accompanying notes 165-66. See also Garrett, 81 Cornell L Rev at 686-87
(cited in note 7).
" See Part il.C.
" The proposal was called the Neutral Cost Recovery System. See David L. Brun-
baugh and Jane G. Gravelle, The Neutral Cost Recovery System and The House Republi-
can Contract, CRS Rep 95-161E (Jan 18, 1995) (explaining pattern of revenue loss of rules
that included both an increase in the depreciation deduction and indexation).
-' See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J L & Econ 211
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the federal government; the Treasury Department and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service ("IRS") can affect tax benefits through their
regulatory authority."8 PAYGO and similar offset requirements
increase the attractiveness of action by the executive branch be-
cause the congressional rules do not apply to regulations. 9 As
the changes to the withholding tables showed in 1992, regulators
even have the ability to provide a broad-based tax cut without
offsetting the revenue loss."0
For years, Congress has succumbed to other off-budget temp-
tations. Sometimes, these end runs are glaringly obvious. For ex-
ample, as part of the 1990 budget deal, the Post Office was placed
off-budget because its expected deficit would have hampered
Congress's efforts to reach its goal of $500 billion in deficit reduc-
tion."' Lawmakers have turned increasingly to unfunded inter-
governmental mandates to implement federal programs without
the constraint of budget rules."' In the same way, restrictions on
(1976); Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 22 (1971);
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 3 (1971).
See also Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Congressional Budget Process: Diagnosis, Prescription,
Prognosis, in W. Thomas Wander, F. Ted Herbert, and Gary W. Copeland, eds, Congres-
sional Budgeting: Politics, Process, and Power 190, 205 (John Hopkins 1984) (discussing
the substitution effects in federal budgeting and noting that there are almost always
regulatory equivalents for budget policies); Hanushek, 6 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt at 15
(cited in note 9) ("Regulatory activities are frequently identified... as being a substitute
for different direct tax and expenditure activities of the government").
"mAgain, my discussion here is not exhaustive because I do not consider a third tax
lawmaking arena, the judicial branch. Courts are not constrained by budget rules, so
lawmakers have an incentive to draft broad language in the hope that the revenue estima-
tors will not base their projections on the broadest reading. Interest groups can then use
lawsuits to push the language in the direction most beneficial to them. Lawmakers may
find this downstreaming alternative less satisfying because it is harder for them to claim
credit for adjudicatory outcomes, and their leverage over judges is much less than the in-
fluence they wield with regulators. Once a court decision has been rendered, its effect be-
comes part of the baseline, and a legislative change reversing the decision can raise reve-
nue to pay for a new tax expenditure.
" Conversely, lawmakers will prefer to legislate changes in tax provisions that will
raise money rather than allowing the executive branch to promulgate regulations making
the change. This trend can be problematic for several reasons. It may increase the com-
plexity of the tax laws as such provisions are typically relatively detailed. In addition, it
will decrease tax administrators' flexibility because amending the Internal Revenue Code
can be more difficult than modifying regulations, particularly when the modifications lose
revenue, thereby triggering offset requirements.
"'President Bush announced the revision in withholding tables in his State of the
Union address on January 28, 1992, 138 Cong ec H 108, and the new system was imple-
mented by March 1.
.See Shuman, Politics and the Budget at 307 (cited in note 9). In the 1980s, the sav-
ings and loan bailout was placed off-budget for similar reasons. See Donald F. Kettl, Defi-
cit Politics: Public Budgeting In Its Institutional and Historical Context 119 (Macmillan
1992).
" See Garrett, 45 U Kan L Rev at 1134 (cited in note 32).
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legislatively enacted tax expenditures result in interest groups
seeking off-budget, regulatory alternatives."' As part of their
strategy, groups seek the support of members of Congress in or-
der to pressure regulators indirectly. This tactic can work be-
cause regulators need to maintain good relations with the legisla-
tive branch that oversees their budgets and thus can intervene in
their affairs."
Often legislators are happy to oblige. If they can get some
credit from interest groups for beneficial regulatory action yet
still appear as deficit hawks to voters, they have lost very little by
adopting budget rules. Voters see the legislative attention paid to
deficit reduction and hear the rhetoric about reduced federal
spending, while lawmakers quietly jawbone regulators."5 Organ-
ized groups have the resources and the motivation to monitor
lawmakers and discover how they are advancing a group's regu-
latory agenda. Moreover, they inform their members of legisla-
tors' activities, which allows the groups to offer credible promises
of electoral and financial support in return for the downstream-
ing.
An interesting example of the relationship among Congress,
regulators, and interest groups is the treasury regulation on
hedging,"' adopted as a response to the Supreme Court's decision
in Arkansas Best Corp v Commissioner." Since the 1955 decision
'"The executive branch was the target of interest group lobbying long before the cur-
rent budget regime was adopted. For example, the oil and gas industry focused attention
on the Tax Legislative Counsel's Office during the consideration of the 1969 Tax Reform
Bill to protect the percentage depletion allowance. Oppenheimer, Oil and the Congres-
sional Process at 86 (cited in note 80). Such pressure has only increased as tax legislation
has become relatively costlier. See Paul Streckfus, Lobbying the IRS and Treasury: The
Reg Comments You Never See, Tax Notes 881 (Feb 6, 1995) ("What may surprise some is
the extent to which the IRS is now subject to taxpayer lobbying."). See also Schlozman and
Tierney, Organized Interests at 272 (cited in note 67) (noting that executive branch agen-
cies generally are the targets of lobbying by corporations and trade associations, more so
than by unions and citizen groups); Wilson, Interest Groups at 59 (cited in note 65) ("The
relationship between bureaucrats and interest groups in the United States is unusually
suffused with politics.").
... See Schlozman and Tierney, Organized Interests at 338 (cited in note 67). The Con-
tract with America Advancement Act of 1996 § 251, Pub L No 104-121, 110 Stat 847, 868,
codified at 5 USCA § 801 (Supp 1997), contains a new provision that increases Congress's
leverage over the IRS and the Treasury. Regulators must now submit all final rules to the
General Accounting Office ("GAO"), and Congress has sixty days to disapprove a rule by
statute before it goes into effect. This legislation codifies and streamlines a power that
Congress has always had: to pass a law overturning agency regulations.
"See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic
Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 Va L Rev
265, 285-86 (1990); Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics 5, 35-36 (Ilinois
1964).
"Treas Reg § 1.1221-22 (temporary regulation promulgated in Oct 1993).
' 485 US 212 (1988).
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in Corn Products Refining Co v Commissioner,"' taxpayers had
treated as ordinary any gains or losses from hedging transactions
designed to protect their trade or business from risk. The Court
in Arkansas Best held that the transaction involved in the case-
a holding company's sale of shares in a failing bank that it had
purchased as a way to add to the bank's capital and to protect its
earlier investment in the bank-was the sale or disposition of
capital assets, resulting in a capital loss."' In dicta, the Court
suggested more broadly that the character of gains or losses from
other more traditional hedging transactions by businesses should
also be capital rather than ordinary." ° The scope of Arkansas
Best was therefore uncertain. The IRS took a relatively aggres-
sive position (treating many business hedges as capital assets), 2'
but the few court cases on point seemed to favor treating losses
from business hedges as ordinary losses.' Numerous interest
groups, including financial institutions, airlines, farmers, and
even other government agencies,M3 petitioned Congress to clarify
the situation.
Members of the tax writing committees wanted to oblige
these constituencies, but revenue concerns limited their ability to
do so. Particularly before the few favorable tax court decisions,
the baseline from which revenue changes were measured in-
cluded assumptions based on the IRS's literal reading of the Su-
preme Court decision. Finding a suitable offset for a provision
that estimators believed would lose billions of dollars was a seri-
ous obstacle.' Moreover, groups resisted the idea that "fixing"
11350 US 46, 53 (1955) (holding that gains and losses from business hedging transac-
tions are ordinary in character).
118485 US at 223.
Id at 220-22.
"'See, for example, Letter from Stuart L. Brown, Associate Chief Counsel (Domestic)
Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, to
Henry Bahn, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Jan 27, 1993) (on file with U Chi L Rev) ("It
is the litigating position of the Internal Revenue Service that short futures and options on
short futures are capital assets even if they are used as business hedges by the taxpayers
who acquire them.").
'"See, for example, Federal National Mortgage Association v Commissioner, 100 Tax
Ct No 36, Tax Ct Mem Dec (CCH) 49, 102 at 4178 (1993).
'The Department of Agriculture was concerned about the viability of its options pilot
program, which was intended to convince farmers to use commodities options as an alter-
native to federal farm price supports. See Letter from Fifteen Members of the Senate Fi-
nance Committee to Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bentsen (Mar 10, 1993) (on file with
U Chi L Rev).
'One tax aide who worked on the issue was told informally that the various proposals
would lose billions of dollars within the budget window, and that if a provision did not re-
quire the taxpayer to identify the character when the hedges were obtained, it would cost
over $10 billion. Phone Interview with Kathleen Black, tax legislative aide to Representa-
tive Fred Grandy (Aug 30, 1994). See Lee A. Sheppard, IRS Response to Arkansas Best-
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their tax problem required them to find a revenue-raiser. Groups
saw Arkansas Best as upending three decades of accepted busi-
ness practices; they argued that their proposals merely restored
the status quo ante.
For several years, members sent letters and met with Trea-
sury officials in both the Bush and Clinton Administrations,
seeking a regulatory solution but to no avail.' Treasury officials
were sympathetic, reflecting the consensus of the tax policy com-
munity that the Court's broad dicta on the character issue was
wrong.26 Nonetheless, executive branch officials worried both
that a regulatory solution would exceed Treasury's delegated
authority and that adopting regulations that lost such significant
revenue would set an unfortunate precedent. (The latter concern
was assuaged when the Service began to lose cases litigated in
the wake of Arkansas Best.) Finally, in the conference report for
HR 2264, the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, the con-
ferees included the following directive:
The conferees understand that hedging transactions are...
important to the management of risks by businesses ...
[and] are part of a sound business strategy in fields as di-
verse as farming, banking, manufacturing, and energy pro-
duction. However, the conferees understand that there may
be a level of uncertainty regarding the tax treatment of such
hedging transactions .... The conferees believe that this is a
significant issue. To the extent a solution to this issue may
require coordination between the executive and legislative
branches, the conferees urge the Administration, in the
strongest terms, to advise the House Ways and Means and
the Senate Finance Committees, within 90 days of the en-
actment of this Act, how best to proceed.27
What the Reporter Saw, Tax Notes 548, 549 (Aug 3, 1992) ("[The uncertain state of the
law applicable to hedging caused a revenue-scoring problem. If a literal reading of Arkan-
sas Best was the baseline, change would be costly. Facing a no-win situation, tax policy-
makers threw up their hands.").
'See Letter from Fifteen Members of the Senate Finance Committee to Fred T. Gold-
berg, Jr., Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury (July 8, 1992) (on
file with U Chi L Rev); Letter to Secretary Lloyd Bentsen (cited in note 123).
'See, for example, Myron C. Grauer, A Case for Congressional Facilitation of a Col-
laborative Model of Statutory Interpretation in the Tax Area: Lessons to be Learned from
the Corn Products and Arkansas Best Cases and the Historical Development of the Statu-
tory Definition of 'Capital Asset(s)", 84 Ky L J 1, 24-25, 56 (1995-96); Edward D. Kleinbard
and Suzanne F. Greenberg, Business Hedges After Arkansas Best, 43 Tax L Rev 393, 414,
419 (1988).
139 Cong Rec H 5950 (Aug 4, 1993) (explanation of Section 13223 of the conference
agreement, new Section 475 of the Internal Revenue Code).
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This language, buried in pages of dense and technical de-
scriptions of tax legislation, is code. The tax writing committees
did not want to "coordinate" a response-coordination might re-
quire legislation. They wanted, "in the strongest terms," for the
executive branch to adopt regulations that would fix the Arkan-
sas Best problem and assuage the demands of the many powerful
interest groups-a fix that for budget purposes was free. The con-
ference report's unambiguous signal reduced the executive
branch's concern that its action would exceed its legal authority.
Within three months, the Treasury issued a new hedging regula-
tion, allowing ordinary treatment of business hedges designed to
reduce the risk of price changes, currency fluctuations, or interest
rate changes as long as the hedges are identified when ac-
quired." It seemed that most of the problems caused by Arkan-
sas Best had been solved, and in a way that allowed Congress to
claim credit without triggering offset requirements.
Recent developments concerning the hedging regulation
demonstrate an additional "bootstrapping benefit" for groups that
succeed in downstreaming. The hedging regulation has now been
attacked as invalid, primarily because it purports to be exclusive
and to supplant conflicting case law."2 Again, uncertainty has
prompted calls for legislation."' But the projected revenue loss is
negligible now because the budget baseline includes the current
regulation.'' Merely codifying a current regulation affects reve-
nues only slightly, if at all, because codification of existing prac-
tice is not expected to change taxpayer behavior significantly. In
other words, a downstreaming strategy pays off for interest
groups even if the regulation that is issued may be invalid. As
long as Congress can codify the regulation before it is overturned,
the post-downstreaming legislation requires only a minimal off-
set, unlike legislation that would have solved the problem in the
first instance.
The Arkansas Best situation is somewhat unusual. Congress
does not usually intervene via instructions in a committee re-
port,"2 and a downstreaming proposal does not often prompt the
' Treas Reg § 1.1221-22.
'See Farmland Industries v Commissioner, Tax Ct No 11881-93. See also Lee A.
Sheppard, Hedging vs. Risk Management, Tax Notes 1300, 1303-04 (June 9,1997).
'See Department of the Treasury, Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3 and Tax Simplification
Proposals (Apr 16, 1997). See also Heidi Glenn and Sheryl Stratton, Treasury's Simplifica-
tion Plan Includes Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3, Tax Notes 305 (Apr 21, 1997).
"'See Sheppard, Tax Notes at 1303. Of course, revenue estimators do consider the
revenue loss associated with regulations that they expect the executive branch will issue
to implement new tax provisions.
'See 26 USCA § 513 (Supp 1997) (exempting sponsorship payments from unrelated
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support of tax policy commentators in addition to the organized
groups pursuing their economic self-interest. Other examples of
downstreaming, such as the exception for state-sponsored prepaid
tuition programs provided in the contingent payment debt in-
strument regulations, lacked convincing policy justifications and
should be seen primarily as a result of interest group clout."m As
offset requirements continue to reduce the ability of groups to get
tax benefits from Congress, advocates of tax expenditures will
turn increasingly to off-budget sources such as regulations.
Again, however, this tactic does not negate entirely the discipline
of PAYGO: regulators often resist the entreaties of interest
groups and lawmakers, as supporters of capital gains tax relief
discovered when the Bush Administration seriously considered
reducing such taxes through regulation but decided against it for
lack of authority.1"
C. Offset Requirements Impose Post-Enactment Costs on
Recipients of Tax Benefits
Regardless of which method is used to secure a tax benefit,
once it is obtained, the group must shift gears and begin protect-
ing it from predators. The costs of this defense are the "post-
business taxable income with negligible revenue effect); Fred Stokeld, Lobbyists, Ex-Hill
Staffers Deny Undue Influence on EO Division, Tax Notes 1396 (Sept 18, 1995) (detailing
congressional involvement in regulations governing the tax treatment for tax-exempt or-
ganizations of corporate sponsorship payments); Nathan Wirtschafter, Note, Fourth Quar-
ter Choke: How the IRS Blew the Corporate Sponsorship Game, 27 Loyola LA L Rev 1465
(1994) (same); Phone Interview with Candi Perotti Wolff, then tax aide to Senator
Malcolm wallop (Aug 30, 1994) (noting that revenue constraints prohibited Congress from
solving problems with implementing the diesel dyeing requirements and indicating that
congressional jawboning had influenced the regulations); David S. Hilzenrath, The Hues
and Cries Over Diesel Dyes, Wash Post F1 (Nov 3, 1993) (discussing regulatory difficulties
with implementing diesel fuel dyeing requirements).
"'The prepaid tuition program exception is also an example of costless codification af-
ter successful downstreaming. Members of Congress pressured the executive branch to ex-
empt state-sponsored plans from taxation and overcame Treasury's recalcitrance in part
by threatening to make it a campaign issue in the 1996 presidential race. One day after
the Treasury "clarified its position" that the plans would not be included in the regula-
tions, the Senate Finance Committee added a provision codifying the exception. Because
the baseline included the Treasury's decision, the legislation was scored as losing no reve-
nue, and it was enacted as part of the final bill. Before the regulatory action, estimators
indicated that the legislative proposal would lose several hundred million dollars within
the PAYGO window. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 § 1806, Pub L No 104-
188, 110 Stat 1755, 1865, codified at 26 USCA § 529 (Supp 1997); Sheryl Stratton, Prepaid
Tuition Programs Major in Political Science, Tax Notes Today Doc 96-19141 (July 3,
1996).
"See President Bush's Statement on Indexing Capital Gains, White House News Re-
lease, in Tax Notes Today Doc 92-8297 (Sept 8, 1992) (expressing disappointment at Jus-
tice's determination that the executive branch could not unilaterally index capital gains).
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enactment costs" of PAYGO and similar congressional rules. Be-
cause any tax expenditure-whether in traditional legislation,
laws with delayed implementation, or off-budget regulations-
can represent revenue to those seeking a new federal tax
program, the beneficiaries must expend resources guarding their
tax subsidy from others in search of an offset. Although delayed
provisions do not lose revenue currently, future revenue loss is in-
cluded in the baseline. Estimators will therefore consider that a
repeal will raise money in the years when the provision would
have been effective. Similarly, baselines reflect the revenue ef-
fects of regulations, so legislative modifications to them also can
raise revenue. Granted, tax provisions always have been at some
risk of being repealed or scaled back, thus forcing beneficiaries to
work to avoid losing valuable expenditures." 5 However, offset re-
quirements increase this risk because every new tax subsidy
must be paid for by a change in existing tax or entitlement laws.
The increased uncertainty about the durability of tax provi-
sions has several important effects that I will discuss later;36 for
example, it affects the relationship between lawmakers and in-
terest groups, and it may result in increased scrutiny of existing
tax provisions. At this point, however, my focus is on the costs in-
volved in protecting a tax benefit and the strategies employed in
such an endeavor. Again, an interest group must consider these
post-enactment costs, as well as the up-front costs, when deciding
whether the benefits of a tax expenditure justify the effort to en-
act it. Although the future costs will be discounted, they add to
the burden imposed on those currently seeking new federal pro-
grams. This added burden should reduce the number of new ex-
penditures enacted, relative to the number that would be enacted
in a budget process without offset requirements. In addition,
beneficiaries of tax provisions enacted before PAYGO must also
embark on strategies of protection to ensure that they continue to
profit from federal subsidies through the Internal Revenue Code.
Groups have a variety of protective mechanisms available to
them; these strategies include both monitoring and signaling ac-
tivities. First, monitoring costs are incurred as interest groups
and their lobbyists invest resources to discover possible threats.'37
' See Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Politi-
cal Extortion 23 (Harvard 1997) (Groups continue to pressure legislators to protect them-
selves against "windfall losses" that could occur if benefits were repealed or reduced.).
'See Parts ).D and I.
' See, for example, Robert H. Salisbury, Putting Interests Back into Interest Groups, in
Cigler and Loomis, eds, Interest Group Politics 371, 382 (cited in note 74) (noting that "a
significant amount of time and energy [of interest groups] is devoted to monitoring,
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They read and analyze the same sources used by groups who are
trying to identify offsets. 8' They watch for new revenue esti-
mates, which might increase the attractiveness of their benefit, or
for new players, such as the administration or key congressional
leaders, who might label their expenditure as an unproductive
"tax loophole" or an example of insidious "corporate welfare."
They pay particularly close attention during committee mark-ups
that may go late into the evening (or into the early morning), be-
cause these may result in the unveiling of carefully guarded offset
proposals-sometimes to the surprise of the unwitting targets.'39
Defeating an offset proposal is more difficult once it appears in a
bill that has passed the committee; it can usually occur only in
conference because successful floor amendments are unlikely.
1 40
Second, and perhaps more prevalent in the budget process
than in other legislative contexts, is signaling, 4 ' a strategy that
current beneficiaries of tax expenditures use to indicate to law-
makers and other interest groups that particular offset proposals
will generate substantial opposition. Remember that groups
seeking to enact a new provision hope to find an offset that is not
aggressively defended. This strategy will reduce up-front costs,
although it will not eliminate the costs that arise from competi-
tion with other predators. A credible signal of vigorous opposition
by those protecting the possible target may be enough to remove
tracking, and assessing the activities of governmental officials"); id at 377 ("It follows from
what has been said that interest groups will spend a great deal of their time and effort
watching what the government does and monitoring policy developments to see how their
group interests might be affected.").
'See text accompanying notes 58-63. See also Bradley, Lobbying Fever (cited in note
83) (quoting chief lobbyist for the National Association of Realtors about an offset proposal
that would affect the real estate industry: "We knew that in all probability this issue
would be on the table and we would have a real fight on our hands. So that's when we
really cranked up the effort and put on the full court press.").
'See, for example, Matlack, Nail J at 267 (cited in note 56) (discussing lobbyist for
Iron-Ore Co of Canada (now the Chief of Staffofthe Joint Tax Committee) who paid for an
exemption from the corporate minimum tax with a last minute proposal to tighten the
rules on the tax deductibility of mobile phones used for business). See also Handler, Tax
Notes at 1268 (cited in note 60) ("The current budget reconciliation system, since it puts a
substantial premium on advance knowledge of the direction of legislative proposals, has
made special interest groups more powerful than ever.").
" See text accompanying notes 45-47 and 82.
... See, for example, Gretchen Morgenson, Look Who's Running a Protection Racket,
Forbes 44 (Sept 8, 1997) (quoting chief lobbyist for the National Federation of Retailers:
"What's true in the jungle is true in Washington: If you appear to be weak, you become
prey."). A related concept of signaling has been developed in the literature that analyzes
congressional oversight of administrative agencies. See, for example, David Epstein and
Sharyn O'Halloran, A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bu-
reaucracy, 11 J L Econ & Org 227 (1995); Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz,
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am J Pol Sci
165 (1984).
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the provision from consideration. There are a number of signals
that can be used, either individually or in combination; these sig-
nals can be costly enough to impart credible information and to
provide a secure defense.42 To give a flavor of such strategies, I
will focus briefly on two: building coalitions and establishing con-
nections to key congressional players.'
Increasingly, modern interest group activity involves forming
coalitions of groups with similar interests with regard to a par-
ticular issue or set of issues.1" Coalitions are formed (or main-
tained) both to seek new tax expenditures and to protect existing
benefits. Perhaps most importantly, coalitions can expand the
base of apparent support along many dimensions. For example,
the coalition supporting the targeted jobs tax credit 45 included
not only the employers and representatives of disadvantaged
groups, but also the management assistance companies, who
were organized and well-funded. The size and composition of a
coalition can provide valuable information for predators, espe-
cially when revenue estimates do not reveal the extent to which
groups benefit from the dynamic effects of tax provisions. Coordi-
nation among groups also can reveal that their supporters span
numerous congressional districts and that they have connections
to more members of Congress than one group alone might com-
mand. In addition, coalitions are often nonpartisan, so they have
the advantage of bipartisan support. Groups rich in financial re-
sources can work beside other groups equipped with hundreds of
supporters; together, they can devise a well-funded and effective
grassroots strategy. Many of these coalitions are formed in an-
ticipation of an attack (often by Washington lobbyists who spe-
"Just as we saw before, smaller groups that can organize more easily and have sub-
stantial resources are more effective at deploying these strategies (this time, to protect the
status quo, rather than to obtain a new benefit) than are groups representing large seg-
ments of the public. See McCubbins and Schwartz, 28 Am J Pol Sci at 172 (cited in note
141).
"Professors Stein and Bickers describe similar strategies in a related budget context,
terming them maintenance strategies. Robert M. Stein and Kenneth N. Bickers, Perpetu-
ating the Pork Barrel: Policy Subsystems and American Democracy 96 (Cambridge 1995).
'"See Diana M. Evans, Lobbying the Committee: Interest Groups and the House Public
Works and Transportation Committee, in Cigler and Loomis, eds, Interest Group Politics
257, 262 (cited in note 74) ("One study of Washington lobbyists showed that 90 percent of
the organizations surveyed participated in coalitions and found themselves doing so in-
creasingly since the 1970s."); Burdett A. Loomis, Coalitions of Interest: Building Bridges
in the Balkanized State, in Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds, Interest Group Poli-
tics 258, 259 (CQ 2d ed 1986) (detailing long history of coalitions in American politics);
Terry M. Moe, The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Po-
litical Interest Groups 62-63 (Chicago 1980) (discussing process of forming coalitions and
various kinds of coalitions that are formed).
" 'See text accompanying notes 75-76.
1998]
The University of Chicago Law Review
cialize in brokering coalitions 4 '). They swing into action only
when monitoring suggests a need, for example, when their provi-
sion appears in a list of disfavored corporate welfare subsidies or
when it is listed as an option for deficit reduction by a think tank
or expert congressional staff.
One of the strongest coalitions in the tax arena has been the
AMT Working Group.'47 The Group is a coalition of diverse, capi-
tal-intensive businesses that was formed both to defeat proposals
that would raise the corporate alternative minimum tax ("AMT")
and to soften the provisions enacted as part of the 1986 Tax Re-
form Act. The National Association of Manufacturers, a trade or-
ganization that is itself a coalition of related businesses, initially
provided much of the coordination for the Group. Although the
Group has supported a variety of proposals to reach its goals,'
one initial effort was to convince members of Congress that in-
creasing the AMT would be disastrous for important constituents.
In other words, the apparently vigorous offense was designed in
part to provide a strong defense against any expansion of the
AMT.' Recently, the Group's efforts successfully convinced law-
makers to pass nearly $20 billion in AMT relief.50
Of course, coalitions are not invincible. Moreover, the larger
and broader the coalition, the more susceptible it may be to tac-
tics that divide members and dissipate its strength. Those form-
ing coalitions thus face a difficult tension. On the one hand, as
Professor Lowi succinctly states, "Large coalitions beat small
coalitions." 5' On the other hand, large coalitions often comprise
groups whose interests are aligned but not identical. Accordingly,
a funding predator can modify the offset to satisfy the concerns of
some of the coalition members, thereby reducing the level of the
opposition and perhaps the coalition's ability to succeed in its
protection strategy. A predator can carve out exceptions, include
grandfather provisions or other transition relief, or redraft the
offset proposal to affect important members only incidentally.
" See Loomis, Coalitions of Interest at 270-72 (cited in note 144).
.'See Companies in the 'AMT Working Group" (Lobbying for Alternative Minimum
Tax Cuts), Tax Notes Today Doc 95-8757 (May 4, 1995).
" See, for example, Minimum Tax Reform Act of 1993, S 858, 103d Cong, 1st Sess (Apr
19, 1993), in 139 Cong Rec S 5280 (Apr 30, 1993).
1'See, for example, 138 Cong Rec S 3628-30 (Mar 13, 1992) (opposing amendment to
increase the corporate AMT rate to pay for a child care tax credit).
" See, for example, Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 401, Pub L No 105-34, 111 Stat 789,
843, codified at 26 USCA § 55 (Supp 1997) (providing AMT exemption for small businesses
and more generous depreciation allowances).
..'Theodore J. Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political
Theory, 16 World Politics 677, 678 (1964).
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Certainly, these modifications reduce the amount of revenue
raised by the offset and limit the size of the new tax benefit, but a
small tax expenditure in some cases will be better than none. And
if members of the target coalition believe a predator is likely to
prevail, they may be willing to negotiate such deals in order to re-
tain some salvage value from the tax expenditure, rather than
walk away empty-handed.
The proposed BTU tax on energy that was part of President
Clinton's first budget submission'52 provides a good example of
both the internal dynamics of coalitions and the difficulty of
maintaining a solid front when members' interests diverge. Again
the National Association of Manufacturers, an expert coalition
broker, formed a coalition to oppose the tax: the Affordable En-
ergy Alliance, which included over nine hundred businesses and
groups."5 The possibility of rifts between members was apparent
when the coalition was formed and some natural allies declined
to join. One crucial player, the Independent Petroleum Associa-
tion of America ("IPAA"), did not participate. Instead, the IPAA
wanted to preserve its flexibility and be able to cut its own deal
(in this case, to move the collection point of any tax away from
the wellhead and perhaps to enact a new tax expenditure for in-
dependent producers)."54 Ultimately, supporters of an energy tax
managed to craft a compromise that gained the support of some
members of the coalition. This compromise led Congress to re-
place the BTU tax with a smaller transportation fuels tax, which
was not strongly opposed by energy intensive manufacturing
companies, utility companies, and the major energy producers. It
did, however, place significant burdens on trucking companies,
railroads, and businesses that rely substantially on transporta-
tion services."' Even at this point, the remaining opponents tried
to strike side deals in return for support. The American Associa-
tion of Railroads indicated a willingness to support the new tax in
return for the future elimination of another tax on railroad fuel, a
" Office of Management and Budget, A Vision of Change for America 105 (GPO 1993).
"'Energy-Intensive Businesses Form Coalition to Fight BTU Tax, NAM Announces,
Daily Tax Rep G-7 (May 6, 1993).
See Timothy Noah, BTU Tax is Dying Death of a Thousand Cuts As Lobbyists Seem
Able to Write Own Exemptions, Wall St J A18 (June 8,1993).
'See The More than 900 Members of the Affordable Energy Alliance (as of May 5,
1993) (on file with U Chi L Rev). A more recent example of a coalition that experienced
cleavages was that of the airlines that opposed airline tax increases. Domestic and inter-
national carriers had different interests, as did regional and national carriers. See Jeremy
Holmes, Aviation Tax Increases Will Face Tough Battles Before Final Bill is Drafted, Daily
Tax Rep G-6, G-7 (June 26, 1997). Ultimately, Congress adopted a per-segment tax that
will burden the small regional companies more than the national airlines.
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deal similar to one already obtained by the truckers.' As this
example illustrates, the leaders of coalitions must spend time not
only lobbying members of Congress but also ensuring that the
coalition remains cohesive and that members do not enter into
individual bargains that undermine the general goals of the coali-
tion.
Whether part of a coalition or not, current beneficiaries of tax
expenditures also spend time forming and maintaining connec-
tions with members of Congress and other participants in federal
lawmaking. In this process, the fact that groups are seeking to
block legislation rather than pass it is a tremendous advantage.
Because legislation can be stopped at many points along the leg-
islative path, groups need only to secure the assistance of one key
player to succeed. Many groups possess ties to important law-
makers that were established during their quest to enact a tax
subsidy. Furthermore, because budget procedures and other con-
gressional rules reduce the ability of lawmakers to amend bills on
the floor, groups can receive the maximum return on their scarce
resources by concentrating on the Finance and Ways and Means
Committees. The electoral strength of incumbents, combined with
a strong seniority system that largely determines committee as-
signments, gives organized groups great certainty about which
legislator will occupy a strategic position in the system.'57
To block attacks at any stage in the legislative process,
groups must communicate publicly the strong support of the piv-
otal lawmakers. There are myriad ways to accomplish such sig-
naling. For example, sympathetic lawmakers can force votes on
nonbinding Sense of the Senate provisions,58 creating a public re-
cord of support for various positions. This signal, however, lacks
some credibility because of its relatively low cost. 5' Committee
members use hearings and mark-ups to signal their support for
particular tax provisions or their allegiance to certain constituen-
cies."s° An example of a strong defense signal occurred during the
'See Memorandum from J.D. Williams to Senator Boren, Railroad Industry Support
of Energy Tax (June 11, 1993) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
See Garrett, 81 Cornell L Rev at 687 (cited in note 7).
A "Sense of the Senate" provision is nonbinding legislation that expresses the sense
of the Senate on an issue. While the vote is binding, the provision is aspirational.
See, for example, H Con Res 64, Concurrent Resolution Setting Forth the Congres-
sional Budget for the United States Government for the Fiscal Years 1994, 1995, 1996,
1997 and 1998, H Rep No 103-48 § 13, 103d Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 3, 1993) (setting forth a
variety of Sense of the Senate provisions, many dealing with the proposed BTU tax on en-
ergy).
"®See, for example, Administration's Energy Tax Proposals, Hearings Before the Sen-
ate Committee on Finance, S Hrg 103-215, 103d Cong, 1st Sess 17-18 (GPO 1993) (state-
ment of Senator Conrad concerning the effect of the energy tax on agriculture); id at 25-26
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consideration of the recent tax bill. Even as the Ways and Means
Committee finished filling out the details of the newly passed tax
programs, the leaders of both houses publicized a letter that they
had sent to President Clinton specifying that the low-income
housing tax credit should not be used as a revenue-raiser. This
letter was a rapid response to suggestions that the White House
and Chairman Archer were considering eliminating the politi-
cally popular tax expenditure as a way to pay for new tax pro-
grams. 6' Such a public commitment by the congressional leader-
ship presents a formidable barrier to funding predators in the
budget context, which is influenced heavily by party leaders, as
well as by committee members.
In sum, offset requirements seem well-designed to achieve
their objective: to make it more difficult to enact new federal pro-
grams through the tax code. They increase the costs of obtaining
a new tax expenditure, and they also increase the costs of main-
taining it once it is obtained. Groups know that any benefit they
manage to enact is susceptible to repeal or modification. Thus,
the costs will continue to mount as groups work to discover any
threats and to discourage raids by projecting a strong and visible
opposition. If these conclusions are right, PAYGO and related
provisions have worked a significant change in federal budgeting
by intensifying and institutionalizing conflict among interest
groups. This leaves us with a puzzle to resolve before turning to
the other ramifications of these budget rules, namely, why would
self-interested legislators, eager to please constituents and inter-
est groups, adopt these requirements and thereby transform the
tax legislative arena?
D. Legislators' Motivations for Adopting Offset Requirements
Scholars who wish to present the legislative process accu-
rately must give careful attention to all the relevant parties. In-
terest groups and voters are crucial determinants of public policy,
but so are the legislators themselves. They are more than con-
duits in the process of turning constituents' desires into law;62
(statement of Senator Boren concerning the effect of the tax on independent producers).
1
'See Joan Pryde, Lott Says Low-Income Housing Credit Will be Protected Under
Budget Pact, Daily Tax Rep G-5 (May 15, 1997).
"See Hamilton, 69 NYU L Rev at 499 (cited in note 69) (contesting traditional public
choice view of legislator as "toll gate" for interest groups); McChesney, Money for Nothing
at 17 (cited in note 135) (criticizing the economic theory of regulation for failing to recog-
nize that legislators are more than mere brokers who "do not actively enter the market for
rents with their own demands"); Schlozman and Tierney, Organized Interests at 396-97
(cited in note 67) (noting that lawmakers are more than "mere refereets]" mediating the
various demands of interest groups). See also Garrett, 81 Cornell L Rev at 660-62 (cited in
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they also seek to achieve certain personal goals from holding of-
fice and will act to further their own interests when deciding how
to legislate. A politician cannot satisfy her preferences unless she
remains in office, so she is inevitably interested in receiving the
financial and electoral support necessary to assure reelection.
Thus, for the most part, one would assume that her interests are
aligned with groups that can provide such aid and that she would
favor congressional rules and procedures that facilitate her abil-
ity to establish federal programs and dispense benefits to sup-
porters and constituents.
Offset requirements are not consistent with this legislative
strategy. As I have detailed, they increase the cost of enacting
valuable tax expenditures. Not only does this situation distress
many hopeful interest groups and their would-be benefactors, but
it also reduces the ability of lawmakers to exercise influence and
power and impedes politicians whose policy goals can be achieved
only through increased federal spending."6 Moreover, as I have
discussed,"6 PAYGO and similar provisions threaten to erode the
durability (and thus the present value) of both existing benefits
and any tax expenditures that are enacted. In short, budget rules
both make it harder to obtain a product and render that product
less valuable. This dual consequence should decrease the willing-
ness of groups to enter the legislative market and reduce the
fundraising ability of members of Congress-not a desirable out-
come for members of Congress.
Before we try to solve this puzzle, it is worth focusing on the
importance of durable commitments in the legislative process.
Legislative deals are inherently unstable, as new lawmakers,
who were not parties to original arrangements, enter the legisla-
ture or as current lawmakers act opportunistically to curry favor
from new interests." However, because lawmakers can receive
note 7) (discussing the goals that motivate politicians and the importance of the threshold
objective of reelection to satisfying all others; also surveying relevant literature).
1In some cases, the political ideology of lawmakers may cause them to favor greater
hurdles to legislation, for example, lawmakers who favor reduced federal influence gener-
ally or a smaller federal government. Depending on the nature of congressional rules,
however, new procedures may frustrate even these legislators if part of their political
agenda involves dismantling current federal programs. But offset requirements should not
stand in their way because the impediments they establish are not triggered by efforts to
repeal existing tax expenditures or to eliminate direct spending-moves that raise, rather
than lose, revenue.
' See text accompanying notes 104-06.
" See McChesney, Money for Nothing at 23 (cited in note 135) ("A legislator not party
to the original bargain has less incentive to abide by the political rent-creation deal struck
by his predecessors unless he too is compensated. Guaranteed rent durability is thus im-
possible."); id at 89 ("Opportunism is possible because the contracts to which politicians
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more financial and electoral support from each beneficiary group
if they offer more durable deals, a variety of institutions have de-
veloped to entrench bargains. For example, incumbency rein-
forced with a strong seniority system and a stable committee
structure assures interest groups that the lawmakers with whom
they bargain will remain in office for years, even decades, and
will occupy positions where they can ward off attempts to repeal
existing tax benefits."
Nonetheless, durability is still a scarce legislative commod-
ity, particularly in the tax arena. Even before the formalization of
offset requirements, the rate of change to the tax laws was in-
creasing, undermining certainty and durability."7 In part, budget
considerations drove this acceleration because Congress often at-
tempted to meet increasingly elusive deficit targets through rec-
onciliation bills with large revenue components. This situation
led Professor McChesney to conclude that, "Congress routinely
contracts over taxation, but only for a certain period. Benefits can
agree are executory. In return for consideration conferred now by taxpayers, the politician
will be expected to perform his part of the deal later, forbearing in the future from tax or
other legislation not in the interests of the private contributor.").
"See Garrett, 81 Cornell L Rev at 687 (cited in note 7). See also W. Mark Crain and
Timothy Muris, Legislative Organization of Fiscal Policy, 38 J L & Econ 311, 320 (1995)
(discussing advantages for durability of stability among committee chairmen); W. Mark
Crain, Legislatures and the Durability of Deficits, in James M. Buchanan, Charles K.
Rowley, and Robert D. Tollison, eds, Deficits 281, 282 (Basil Blackwell 1986) (discussing
how committees function as "a means to cement current political agreements"). See gener-
ally W. Mark Crain and Robert D. Tollison, Time Inconsistency and Fiscal Policy: Empiri-
cal Analysis of US States, 1969-89, 51 J Pub Econ 153, 166 (1993) (noting that placing re-
strictions on the ability of a future legislature to renege on current deals gives legislative
contracts a higher present value and detailing possible restrictions that Congress could
adopt); William N. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Inter-
est-Group Perspective, 18 J L & Econ 875, 878 (1975) ("The element of stability or conti-
nuity necessary to enable interest-group politics to operate in the legislative arena is sup-
plied, in the first instance, by the procedural rules of the legislature, and in the second in-
stance by the existence of an independent judiciary.").
" Indeed, Eugene Steuerle labeled the 1980s "The Tax Decade" because of the salience
and frequency of tax legislation during this period. G. Eugene Steuerle, The Tax Decade
(cited in note 4). See also Richard L. Doernberg and Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerat-
ing Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 Minn L Rev 913, 920-23 (1987) (re-
viewing studies of accelerating pace of legislative change in the tax law); Harold L Apolin-
sky, This is Tax Reform? The Changes Just Cost Money, Wash Post C8 (Apr 6, 1986)
(finding that while in the past, major tax reform occurred approximately once every fifteen
years, from 1976-84, six major tax bills had been passed making over 5,800 changes in the
tax code); Witte, Politics and Development of Income Tax at 290 (cited in note 66) (noting
increase in the pace of enacting and modifying tax expenditures). But see David J. Sha-
kow, The Flood of Tax Legislation, Tax Notes 521, 522 (Apr 22, 1996) (putting the change
in tax legislation into a larger perspective and concluding that "compared to all new leg-
islation, the trend of tax laws since 1954 has been generally to decrease over time, and the
increase that did occur in the middle 1980s was much less dramatic than a simple page
count would suggest").
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be rented briefly, not purchased for all time. Moreover, one also
discovers, the rental period available on tax relief is of decreasing
durability."" One might have expected Congress to construct in-
stitutions that could reverse this trend. Instead, they institution-
alized PAYGO and further destabilized tax lawmaking.
One possible reason behind this surprising behavior is that
lawmakers adopted offset requirements without fully under-
standing the extent to which they would change the dynamics of
tax legislation, instead believing that the new rules were largely
empty symbolic gestures. The conditions surrounding budgeting
are particularly ripe for symbolic lawmaking; unlike the special
interests to whom legislators direct substantive lawmaking, those
concerned with the deficit tend to be unorganized, ill-informed
groups."' 9 Reassuring the public with purely symbolic budget
rules, legislators could continue to send tangible resources to the
organized groups, who have superior information and clout.
Moreover, because their concerns about the federal budget are
more abstract than specific, the general public might be easily
contented with symbolism. Polls and other data consistently re-
veal that while voters proclaim they are deficit hawks and desire
smaller government, they also support numerous, expensive fed-
eral programs and are unwilling to make the kinds of spending
sacrifices necessary to meet their professed deficit goals. For ex-
ample, while they identify the budget deficit as the most impor-
tant issue facing the federal government, 7 ' most Americans also
want to maintain Medicare spending at its current level, even if
that undermines deficit reduction.' More than half would prefer
a budget that makes smaller cuts in programs, even at the price
of a higher deficit, than a budget containing more deficit reduc-
tion but deeper cuts in programs. 72 In other words, the electorate
" McChesney, Money forNothing at 95 (cited in note 135).
"See Edelman, Symbolic Uses of Politics at 36 (cited in note 115) (discussing how
legislators use symbolism to satisfy large, unorganized, and ill-informed groups, which he
calls Pattern B groups, while sending real benefits to the organized, which he calls Pat-
tern A groups); Hayes, Lobbyists and Legislators at 69 (cited in note 77); Loomis and Ci-
gler, Introduction at 5 (cited in note 74). See also Shaviro, 139 U Pa L Rev at 47-48 (cited
in note 67) (applying Edelman's theory to tax reform legislation). How issues become sali-
ent to members of Pattern B groups is a complex question. In this Article, I do not attempt
to trace how the federal deficit became a matter of such public concern that it prompted
Congress to adopt GRH and other budget rules. For a discussion of this, see generally
Shaviro, Do Deficits Matter? (cited in note 94).
1.. Harris Poll (June 5, 1997) (reporting that 19 percent identifying it as one of the two
most important issues).
.NBC News/Wall St J Poll (Oct 31, 1995) (reporting that 52 percent wanted Medicare
spending maintained even at the cost of deficit reduction).
NBC News/Wall St J Poll (Aug 1, 1995) (reporting that 55 percent favored the for-
mer). See also 139 Cong Rec S 10706 (daily ed, Aug 6, 1993) (statement of Senator Robert
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might not only be mollified by symbols, they might actually reject
incumbents who delivered more than symbolic action on the defi-
cit.
The problem with this explanation is that the rules are more
than empty gestures. Requirements of revenue neutrality in-
crease the costs of enacting tax expenditures and undermine
their durability. Perhaps everyone simply adopted real change by
mistake. That supposition seems rather unpersuasive, however,
because PAYGO was codified after years of experience both with
the informal norm of revenue neutrality and with GRH's offset
requirements for discretionary spending. Perhaps the demand for
some action with regard to deficit spending was so pressing that,
in order to stave off this short-term electoral threat, legislators
were forced to adopt offset requirements, hoping they would have
only minimal effects on their long-term ability to extract rents
and enact new programs." 3
A different group of observers of the legislative process might
offer a second explanation for the adoption of these budget rules.
Rather than leaving underlying relationships between organized
interests and lawmakers untouched, they might argue, offset re-
quirements clearly alter the balance-but to the advantage of the
lawmakers themselves (or, at least, not to their disadvantage). In
short, PAYGO is entirely consistent with the notion that legisla-
tors act in their own self-interest, because they will continue to
receive as much, if not more, financial rewards from organized in-
terests while appearing to the voters to be making real headway
on the federal deficit. This argument still relies on the notion of
symbolism in that lawmakers are not particularly concerned that
budget rules actually decrease the deficit (although such a result
might make their campaign claims more credible). But this ex-
planation differs from the previous one because organized, well-
informed interest groups may be unable to receive the same
amount of benefits as they did before PAYGO. Here, I am ex-
trapolating in part from the work of Professor McChesney and his
theory of rent extraction. 74
Kerrey) (arguing that budget problems "exist because of rapid, uncontrolled growth in
programs that primarily benefit the middle class" and indicating concern that lawmakers
and voters are not willing to undertake the "shared sacrifice" necessary to regain budget-
ary control).
'"Another example of a short-term political crisis overwhelming legislators' long-term
interests may have occurred when they indexed brackets for inflation, depriving them-
selves of automatic tax rate increases.
"McChesney's work has appeared in a series of articles, most notably, Fred S.
McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J
Legal Stud 101 (1987). Recently, he compiled and extended his work in McChesney, Money
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The economic theory of legislation posits that the legislature
works like a market, where interest groups compensate lawmak-
ers for supplying them with a product: laws dispensing federal
largesse. Theoretically, groups should be willing to pay legislators
(through campaign contributions, in-kind benefits and other legal
gifts, post-tenure employment, and the occasional illegal gratuity)
up to the discounted present value of the benefit.'75 The analogy
to a free market is not exact, however, because a variety of laws
limit such financial rewards and thus cap the price legislators
can extract below the amount some interest groups would be
willing to pay. Therefore, any major revenue bill enacts tax ex-
penditures worth far more to groups than the groups spend to get
them.'78 For example, the 1993 tax bill included targeted relief for
the real estate industry estimated to reduce federal revenues by
$9.1 billion over the first five years of enactment; 7 the provisions
were worth much more than that to realtors, contractors, inves-
tors, and related industries.78 In 1992 through 1994, however,
real estate interests contributed only $29.7 million to the cam-
paign coffers of members of Congress. 9 In fairness, this figure is
for Nothing (cited in note 135). A simpler, but less persuasive, explanation than the one
presented in the text is also possible. Lawmakers will be indifferent with respect to
adopting offset requirements if the total benefits they receive under a system with PAYGO
equal those in the alternative regime. Although any decline in durability caused by offset
requirements means that benefits are worth less, perhaps more groups will be willing to
enter the market for tax expenditures, maintaining lawmakers' aggregate compensation.
The problem with this explanation is that it is difficult to imagine more buyers entering a
market where the product has simultaneously become less valuable and more expensive.
On the contrary, one would expect the number of buyers to decline. Perhaps they will pay
more for the benefits than they did before PAYGO, which again may result in legislators
receiving as much in interest group benefits as they do now;, but limits on the amount of
compensation that can be legally transferred, see text accompanying notes 175-79, suggest
that the market cannot make that adjustment either.
'See Garrett, 81 Cornell L Rev at 686-87 (cited in note 7); Jonathan R. Macey, Pro-
moting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 Colum L Rev 223, 227-29 (1986).
17See, for example, Shaviro, 139 U Pa L Rev at 73 (cited in note 67) ("One might ob-
serve that $6.7 million [in campaign contributions to members of the tax writing commit-
tees] seems astoundingly cheap given the enormous stakes (in 1985, a typical recent year,
the income tax took in roughly $400 billion, or 60,000 times as much).").
"Joint Committee on Taxation, Summary of the Revenue Provisions of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (H.R. 2264) 32-41 (GPO 1993).
"See National Association of Realtors, Deficit-Reduction Bill is Good for Real Estate
and the Economy (Aug 3, 1993) (blaming changes in passive loss rules in the 1986 bill for
part of the drop in the value of commercial properties by $500 billion during the early
1990s); Clinton Speech to Realtors on Passive Loss Provisions, Other Parts of Tax Pro-
grams, Tax Notes Today Doc 93-9359 (Apr 29, 1993) (claiming that reduced interest rates
would put hundreds of billions of dollars back into the economy); 139 Cong Rec S 1450
(Feb 4, 1993) (citing Mortgage Bankers Association study that claimed OBRA 1993 would
cause property values to rise by 3 to 7 percent).
"These figures are derived from the Center for Responsive Politics Web Page,
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somewhat misleading. Most obviously, the amount of campaign
contributions and other expenses understate the payments made
to obtain the tax relief in many ways. First, efforts in earlier
years laid the foundation for the 1993 changes. Second, individu-
als and groups who contributed may not be easily identifiable
from available records as affected parties. Third, the figure does
not include other lobbying costs.8 ' Finally, the figure does not in-
clude many gifts, trips, and future employment opportunities
that were part of this deal. Furthermore, no rational group would
pay as much as the present value of the $9 billion tax subsidy,
because at the time they incur the expenses there is no guarantee
they will prevail. Legislative players operate in conditions of ex-
treme uncertainty, and their willingness to compensate lawmak-
ers is affected by that environment. Nonetheless, the payments
by the real estate industry seem likely to be significantly lower
than the groups would have been willing to pay for such substan-
tial financial benefits.
If legislators face binding caps on the amount of payments
they can receive from a group in any one period, one way around
them is through installment payments. Moreover, if uncertainty
about lawmakers' ability to deliver constrains interest groups'
spending, it makes sense for the parties to agree to delay some of
the payments until after performance. The challenge is to find a
way to convince groups to continue to pay after they have re-
ceived their tax benefit, that is, to reduce the chance of oppor-
tunistic behavior by federal beneficiaries before legislators have
received all their compensation. Applying the concept of rent ex-
traction here might lead to the conclusion that PAYGO operates
as an enforcement clause because it provides a credible threat to
holders of tax benefits that, absent continued compensation, Con-
gress will withdraw their benefits and repeal the tax subsidy.
Professor McChesney explains that:
[P]ayments to politicians often are made, not for particular
political favors, but to avoid particular political disfavor, that
is, as part of a system of political extortion, or 'rent extrac-
tion.'... Because the state, quite legally, can (and does) take
money and other forms of wealth from its citizens, politicians
<http//www.crp.org/net/frsecret.html>, and the third and fourth edition of their publica-
tion, Larry Matkinson, ed, Open Secrets: The Encyclopedia of Congressional Money and
Politics (CQ 3d ed 1994); Larry Matkinson, ed, Open Secrets: The Encyclopedia of Congres-
sional Money and Politics (CQ 4th ed 1996).
'See John R. Wright, Interest Groups & Congress: Lobbying, Contributions and Influ-
ence 11 (Allyn & Bacon 1996) (estimating conservatively, using 1988 data, that the total
operating cost for the entire lobbying industry is $12 billion annually).
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can extort from private parties payments not to expropriate
private wealth.... In that sense, rent extraction-receiving
payments not to take or destroy private wealth-is 'money
for nothing,' in the words of the song.18'
Rent extraction is hardly new in the tax legislative process.
Indeed, McChesney has focused often on the tax writing commit-
tees as arenas where this kind of behavior is commonplace.'82
Rent extraction is theoretically possible in any legislative realm
because legislators always have the ability to repeal existing
beneficial legislation or to enact burdensome laws. One of the
conditions necessary for effective extraction, however, is that the
victim must believe that the chances are great that Congress will
overcome the hurdles to legislation and actually pass the harmful
law."m Even before offset requirements, the frequency with which
Congress passed new tax legislation and decreased various tax
subsidies produced enough uncertainty that current beneficiaries
of tax expenditures might have been regularly worried that their
provisions would be scaled back or eliminated.' Professor Witte's
study of tax expenditures demonstrates that before 1982, such
provisions were decreased or restricted 64 of the 195 times they
were modified (although expansion or increases were much more
likely, occurring 117 times during this period).'85 For the most
part, however, before brackets were indexed and deficit concerns
took center state, Congress was subject to very little pressure to
restrict current tax subsidies.
Obviously, the scramble to find revenue prompted by offset
requirements makes the threat of repeal all the more credible to
18 McChesney, Money for Nothing at 2-3 (cited in note 135). See also McChesney, 16 J
Legal Stud at 104-05 (cited in note 174).
"See McChesney, Money for Nothing at 62-66 (cited in note 135). See generally Do-
ernberg and McChesney, 71 Minn L Rev 913 (cited in note 167); Richard L. Doernberg and
Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
62 NYU L Rev 891 (1987). See also Edmund Morris, The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt 171
(Coward, McCann & Geoghegan 1979) (describing practice in New York state legislature
of "strike bills" introduced to force companies to pay assembly members not to pass them).
"McChesney, Money for Nothing at 38 (cited in note 135).
"See William F. Shughart, Durable Tax Reform, 7 Cato J 273, 274 (1987)
("[R]epeated efforts at 'reform' create a situation in which tax shares are considered up for
grabs' in each and every budgetary period. As a result, the reform process becomes an an-
nual contest among interest groups to preserve existing tax preferences, or to shift tax li-
abilities to other groups.").
"Witte, Politics and Development of Income Tax at 319 table 15.4 (cited in note 66)
(tabulating actions on general economic and special economic incentives). For special
group incentives, which benefit organized groups but may not be designed to foster eco-
nomic growth, the threat was even more credible because they were decreased or re-
stricted ten times out of eighteen and expanded or increased only seven times.
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current beneficiaries.' For example, Professor Witte compared
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which was considered pursuant to
the informal norm of revenue neutrality, to previous tax bills and
found that "[by all measures, TRA dwarfs any of the three prior
peacetime reform acts (1969, 1982, and 1984)."' The Act re-
stricted seventy-two tax expenditures, completely repealing four-
teen, "a figure approximately equal to the total number of tax ex-
penditures that had been repealed from 1913 and 1985."' Witte
credits this change to the requirement of revenue neutrality
within the tax code coupled with the decision not to raise income
tax rates, conditions that continued to shape tax bills until the
1997 Taxpayer Relief Act, which used cuts in direct spending to
fund tax breaks.'89
Political scientists and other scholars have done very little
careful analysis on the creation, modification, and repeal of tax
expenditures since 1986. Witte's most comprehensive study ex-
tends only to legislation passed before 1982; others measure
merely the rate of change, rather than its direction."9 More em-
pirical work is needed to quantify precisely the effect of offset re-
quirements on tax expenditures; however, we can conclude as a
preliminary matter that PAYGO adds credibility to rent extrac-
tion strategies. Revenue bills affected by offset requirements have
long sections of revenue-raising provisions, many of which scale
back or eliminate tax expenditures. Since 1990, some legislation
expanding entitlement programs also has been partially offset by
higher tax revenue, further threatening the beneficiaries of tax
subsidies.' 9' Although the pressure on current tax expenditures is
less pronounced in the current budget environment in which enti-
tlement reforms produce money for tax cuts, the Taxpayer Relief
Act repealed or curtailed enough tax subsidies to raise nearly
$110 billion over ten years.'92
Understanding this political reality, groups will be willing to
pay lawmakers up to the amount of future expected benefits in
IM See, for example, Morgenson, Forbes at 44 (cited in note 141) ("A Congressman need
only say a few words about changing an aspect of tax law-and money pours in from lob-
byists and PACs intent on averting a disaster.").
I" John F. Witte, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: A New Era in Tax Politics?, 19 Am Pol Q
438, 443 (1991). Witte explains his method of counting in Chapters 13 and 15 of his book,
The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax (cited in note 66).
-Witte, 19 Am Pol Q at 443.
1 Id at 445, 447.
'See note 167.
"'See, for example, Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, Pub L No
102-164, 105 Stat 1049, codified at 26 USC § 6654 (1994).
" Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects (cited in note 98).
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order to convince legislators to spare their tax provision. Each
session of Congress offers another opportunity to extract more
political rent and requires additional resources for signaling. In
other words, PAYGO increases the transaction costs facing inter-
est groups, but allows legislators to receive some of the new pay-
ments. At the same time, lawmakers also will collect payments
from groups seeking new benefits.
One problem with this analysis of the adoption of PAYGO is
that it does not explain why legislators did not adopt the system
before 1990. If rent extraction is a successful strategy for law-
makers, why did they wait so long to implement it or a similar in-
stallment-payment program (such as making tax subsidies tem-
porary and requiring Congress to reenact them periodically)?
This complaint is related to a frequently voiced criticism of the
economic theory itself. Rent extraction, combined with the tradi-
tional economic model of legislation, allows scholars to explain
every action we observe in Congress in terms of this market
model; it thereby loses a great deal of its explanatory and predic-
tive force. 9 ' If legislation is enacted, then the beneficiaries must
have outbid their rivals; if legislation is not enacted, the rivals
clearly won. If a particular offset is used to pay for a new tax
benefit, the holders of the repealed provision simply must not
have paid enough to avoid the burden, perhaps erroneously be-
lieving that Congress was bluffing. If the offset is proposed but
does not pass, holders of the targeted provision must have met
the extortionate demand in order to continue enjoying the federal
program. More importantly, the theory adopts the inaccurate
view of legislators as one-dimensional seekers of financial re-
wards from special interest groups. While virtually all who wish
to stay in Congress must seek campaign funds, many use their
political offices not just to receive more financial compensation
from special interests, but also to affect policy outcomes. Offset
requirements, which make legislating more difficult, will frus-
trate these lawmakers' goals of exercising power and influence
and of enacting particular federal programs through changes in
the tax code. Using rent extraction to explain the adoption of
PAYGO also ignores those members who sincerely support offset
requirements as devices to reduce federal spending.
But I am using the notion of rent extraction for a rather lim-
ited purpose: to explain why offset requirements are not neces-
'See Shaviro, 139 U Pa L Rev at 75 (cited in note 67) (noting that rent extraction
theory exacerbates the already great risk of reducing public choice theory to a tautology).
See also id at 73-76 (criticizing Doernberg and McChesney's application of rent extraction
theory to the 1986 Act).
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sarily incompatible with lawmakers' self-interest."M This discus-
sion is only part of a larger story of the current budget rules.
Legislators may have a tendency to favor rent extraction strate-
gies (or at least to give them serious consideration), but interest
groups have every incentive to oppose them. Before PAYGO, in-
terest groups were able to stave off most efforts to make tax sub-
sidies temporary or to enhance rent extraction opportunities. As
the size of the federal deficit became a substantial political issue
and thus revenues became more constrained, the prior political
equilibrium was upset, and institutional change became inevita-
ble. When Congress enacted PAYGO in 1990, the norm of reve-
nue neutrality had already been developed, although in part for
different purposes, during deliberations of the 1986 Tax Reform
Act.195 The prominence of this norm shaped the procedural re-
sponse; congressional experience with this particular solution
lowered the costs of building consensus in favor of the reform and
imbued it with an air of legitimacy.
Members of Congress may have favored retaining the status
quo without offset requirements because they preferred the free-
dom to dispense tax benefits. At least some of these members,
however, did not oppose the reform because they knew, from ex-
perience, that such compensation would hardly disappear under
the new system.' Moreover, all members of Congress would not
be affected in the same way by any particular budget change;
such a divergence of interest may explain why some members
supported PAYGO as the best of several bad alternatives. For ex-
ample, due to the increase in downstreaming brought on by
PAYGO, legislators with expertise in facilitating regulatory ex-
penditures (as well as the President and Treasury officials) might
have known that their skills would be in greater demand under a
system that restricted the ability to pass legislative tax subsidies.
The tax writing committees might have preferred that Congress
not apply budget procedures to legislation within their jurisdic-
"Similarly, one need not explain all congressional behavior affecting the tax code in
terms of rent extraction or public choice theory in order for the theory to be convincing or
helpful. Some tax subsidies, such as need-based expenditures, may be best understood as
consistent with the larger public interest. However, interest group politics and rent ex-
traction may describe a great deal of the legislative activity at the margin. It also may
characterize most of the activity with regard to changes to the Internal Revenue Code that
Congress considers every one or two years when it enacts comprehensive tax bills.
'See text accompanying notes 27-28.
'The total campaign receipts received by members of the tax writing committees in
1987-88 were over $55 million; in 1989-90, they received nearly $43.5 million; and in 1990-
91, their campaign receipts were approximately $44 million. The unusually high figure for
the 1987-88 election cycle is partly explained by the fact that over half of the members of
the Senate Finance Committee were up for reelection.
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tion, but once change became virtually inevitable, they could have
determined that the overall effect of the 1990 reform strength-
ened them relative to members who do not serve on Ways and
Means or Senate Finance. PAYGO allows these committees to
construct important bills using entitlement programs within their
jurisdictions and changes to the Internal Revenue Code, with no
interference from appropriators and little from the budget com-
mittees. The new points of order strengthened the Rules Commit-
tee in the House, which has the ability to waive the objections in
a special rule.'97 The 1990 changes somewhat increased the im-
portance of the budget committees in the process; the changes
also empowered congressional leaders who play vital roles in co-
ordinating legislation and negotiating during the budget summits
that settle interbranch disagreements over major legislation.
Legislators were not the only interested parties who could
have determined that offset requirements were not necessarily
incompatible with their desire to raise money from interest
groups. PAYGO and the other rules also benefit lobbyists, the
agents of interest groups, because such procedures promise them
continued compensation long after they succeed in convincing
legislators to enact a tax expenditure. Lobbyists are often the
reason that interest groups are well informed about the ramifica-
tions of legislative actions. In this instance, it might not have
been in their interests to alert their principals to the threat posed
by offset requirements or to lend their full energies to defeating
their extension into the tax arena. The opacity of such procedures
might have allowed lobbyists to deviate from their principals' in-
terests without detection. In addition, some interest groups might
have decided that PAYGO was the least detrimental method to
control federal spending to meet the public demand for lower fed-
eral deficits. Groups that benefited from existing tax expendi-
tures would favor, relative to other reforms, budget rules that
protected the status quo. Although, compared to the situation be-
fore 1990, PAYGO reduces the durability of previously enacted
provisions that become prey for funding predators, it might be
less unsettling to established groups than a reform that would
require regular sunsetting, and it certainly places more burdens
on new entrants than it does on current beneficiaries.
This story of the adoption of PAYGO does not mean that off-
set requirements are meaningless or undesirable; indeed, they
" See Kiewiet and McCubbins, Logic of Delegation at 88-90 (cited in note 92) (noting
that the points of order in the budget process significantly strengthened the House Rules
Committee, which determines whether a special rule will waive the objections).
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appear to have restrained the amount of federal spending
through the tax code, and they may have other beneficial effects
that I shall now discuss. It merely means that their adoption is
neither inexplicable nor necessarily heroic.'98
III. OFFSET REQUIREMENTS RESULT IN CONGRESSIONAL
SCRUTINY OF EXISTING TAX EXPENDITURES
The Department of Treasury released the first Tax Expendi-
ture Budget several years before the 1974 Budget Act required
the legislative and executive branches of government formally to
disclose extensive information about tax expenditures.' Propo-
nents of vigorous tax expenditure review had advocated changes
more far-reaching than mere disclosure, but they hoped that the
additional information would allow policymakers to be "more con-
crete and precise about the objectives of our programs . . . [to]
[elxamine longer term alternatives before reaching decisions...
[and to] [W]ink our planning efforts more directly to budget deci-
sions.' ° Ideally, legislators, armed with better data and fuller
understandings, would review tax expenditures regularly and de-
cide whether to retain them. The tax expenditure system would,
in theory, no longer run on automatic pilot.
Whether this new access to information has brought about
the anticipated periodic review is unclear. As promised, the
budget process did result in a deluge of information."0 ' The wide
availability of the information, however, has not resulted in any
'It may also be that the current situation is not stable. Just as the deficit targets im-
posed by GRH were first postponed and then eliminated, politicians may decide to repeal
or weaken PAYGO if it disrupts rent-seeking and other political arrangements substan-
tially. So far, evidence suggests that PAYGO is a stable outcome (it having been extended
through 2002), but it does expire occasionally, requiring an affirmative congressional vote
to remain in effect.
' See Bernard Wolfinan, Tax Expenditures: From Idea to Ideology, 99 Harv L Rev 491,
494 (1985) (review of Surrey and McDaniel, Tax Expenditures (cited in note 25)); Theodore
J. Eismeier, The Power Not to Tax: A Search for Effective Controls, 1 J Pol Analysis &
Mgmt 333, 336 (1982). See also Surrey and McDaniel, Tax Expenditures at 45 (cited in
note 25) (detailing requirements of the Budget Act); Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax
Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures (Harvard 1973) (discussing concepts by main
proponent of the idea of tax expenditures and of the need for information in the policy-
making process).
'Department of Treasury, Annual Report of the Secretary of Treasury for the Fiscal
Year Ended June 30, 1968 327 (GPO 1968). See also Eismeier, 1 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt at
336 ("But its strongest proponents see the Tax Expenditure Budget as much more than a
source of information.").
"The responsibility for disclosure is dispersed among numerous players: budget
committees, tax writing committees, appropriations committees, and technical staffs in
both the legislative and executive branches.
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regularized review process for tax expenditures." 2 Instead, the
primary mechanisms that ensure the information will actually af-
fect tax policy are PAYGO and related offset requirements.0 ' Put
simply, PAYGO creates a clientele for the review of tax expendi-
tures. Moreover, offset requirements restructure the nature of
congressional deliberation, often forcing members to compare new
proposals with other proposals and existing provisions. Prior
analysis of PAYGO has not recognized this effect; instead, some
commentators have described offset requirements as affecting
only new programs and ignoring, or even entrenching, the status
quo."' Certainly, the most salient effect of these rules is the bur-
den they place on the enactment of new tax expenditures, but the
informational consequences are felt more broadly. In the follow-
ing Parts, I first will describe how conflict ensures that more in-
formation about tax expenditures is generated and that private
parties who stand to gain from tax legislation bear some of the
costs of disclosure. Then, I will assess whether this rather indi-
rect enforcement mechanism can act as a relatively effective sur-
rogate for more formalized review of tax subsidies.0 '
A. Offset Requirements Provide Congress with More
Information About Tax Expenditures
PAYGO encourages private entities to supply and evaluate
necessary information by rewarding them for participating in a
certain kind of informed argument about tax expenditures. In a
Stanley S. Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Leg-
islative Process, in Henry J. Aaron and Michael J. Boskin, eds, The Economics of Taxation
123, 128, 143 (Brookings 1980).
See Wildavsky and Caiden, New Politics at 134 (cited in note 8) (noting generally
about offset requirements and budget rules that "implementation of budget reform be-
comes easier because the participants will enforce it upon one another").
'See note 15.
'This discussion may remind the court-centrists who have ventured into this study of
the legislative process of the debate concerning the information-generating and informa-
tion-structuring aspects of the adversarial system. See, for example, John C. Reitz, Why
We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 Iowa L Rev 987,
990-91 (1990) (describing the controversy over the comparative accuracy of the adversarial
system and the Continental system); Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The
Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 Mich L Rev 734, 742-44 (1987) (arguing that adversarial
system produces more accurate information); Albert Alschuler, Mediation With A Mugger:
The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tiered Trail System in Civil
Cases, 99 Harv L Rev 1808, 1836-57 (1986) (arguing that, in part because of problems in
factfinding inherent in an adversarial system with unevenly matched sides, discovery
should be conducted primarily by a judge); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in
Civil Procedure, 52 U Chi L Rev 823, 841-48 (1985) (comparing the adversarial system to
the Continental tradition of relying on the court to investigate and present the facts, and
finding the latter preferable).
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way, this consequence is merely a different kind of rent extrac-
tion, because lawmakers obtain helpful information from private
parties without compensating them. As advocates of new tax sub-
sidies work to enact their programs, they research likely targets
and share some of the information they develop with lawmakers
and technical staffs. Although these groups most likely are inter-
ested only in discovering the strength of support for the current
provision, their data may also shed light on whether a tax provi-
sion is efficient, whether it provides the intended incentive, or
whether it has significant macroeconomic effects that current es-
timating techniques do not capture. The groups probably do not
care whether a potential offset represents unwise public policy,
but they nonetheless will often use policy arguments when they
publicly justify their revenue-raising suggestions.2"'
Similar information is presented with respect to new tax ex-
penditures. Advocates of proposed legislation always want to dis-
close favorable data to legislators, but, with PAYGO, the groups
supporting the targeted offset counter the arguments in order to
block the proposal's enactment.2 7 This safeguard works best
when the latter groups have, and will spend, the resources neces-
sary to counterattack. Even in the absence of an active prey, off-
set requirements may cause predators to fight among themselves
for limited federal resources. In this battle, competing interest
groups will produce information by comparing various new pro-
grams in an attempt to sell their particular proposal to lawmak-
ers. Again, the ultimate decisions may turn largely on political
considerations such as interest group clout and constituency con-
cerns, but the public debate will encompass arguments on tradi-
tional tax policy grounds.
'See Jon Elster, The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in
Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, eds, Foundations of Social Choice Theory 103, 112-13
(Cambridge 1986) (suggesting that in public discourse, the requirement that at least lip
service be paid to arguments about the public good may lead to sincere consideration of
such reasons for action); Garrett, 45 U Kan L Rev at 1178 (cited in note 32) (arguing that
those who use policy arguments strategically in political debate may "spark sincere delib-
eration of those issues in appropriate cases"). See also Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thomp-
son, Democracy and Disagreement 100-01 (Belknap 1996).
On the policy benefit of such an effect, see Wright, Interest Groups & Congress at
180 (cited in note 180) (noting that interest groups can mislead lawmakers and the public
more easily in the absence of pluralistic conflict). See also id at 96 (describing the informa-
tion strategies of interest groups as both proactive (to change a policy position) and coun-
teractive (to prevent an opposing group from changing a policy position)); Epstein and
O'Haloran, 11 J L Econ & Org at 228-29 (cited in note 141) ("In all cases, a greater num-
ber of interest groups makes legislators better off, and in many cases they also make
agencies better off, by reducing the uncertainty surrounding policy outcomes.&").
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More information is not unambiguously good, however. Its
benefits depend both on the cost of producing the information and
the quality of the information disclosed. Without more study, it is
difficult to assess the first factor, the cost of information. Because
a large part of their daily activities concern gathering, processing,
and disseminating information, organized interests are likely to
be efficient producers of such data.0 8 They are information spe-
cialists, particularly with regard to their own interests and re-
lated programs. With offset requirements ubiquitous in budget-
ing, interest groups apply their sophisticated techniques to devel-
oping information about other groups' tax benefits that could
serve as revenue-raisers. As one news source explained after
GRH implemented offset rules for discretionary programs,
"[i]nstead of concentrating on their own narrow interests, [corpo-
rate lobbyists] are gathering every shred of information they can
find on the budget as a whole."20 9 Nonetheless, generating infor-
mation through interest group conflict may be unnecessarily
costly for society, even though this cost is not borne directly by
the government; instead, it is externalized to those who benefit or
hope to benefit from federal largesse. Without coordination, du-
plicative efforts are likely, not only by government entities pro-
ducing the same information as private parties, but also by com-
peting interest groups. Coordination can be achieved among the
latter in coalitions of those with similar interests, but it is practi-
cally impossible between predator and prey or among predators.
If privately produced information is replacing government ef-
forts, it could be saving government resources and reducing the
overall cost. One way to test this hypothesis might be to compare
the volume of government-provided information relating to tax
expenditures before and after the adoption of offset requirements.
I suspect, however, that such data would be relatively unhelpful.
First, in the early years of the federal budget process, the idea of
tax expenditures was relatively new to politicians, and the vol-
ume of official information might have been sub-optimal. There-
fore, choosing an appropriate baseline and determining the cause
for any variation will be difficult. Second, the government might
'See Robert IL Salisbury, The Paradox of Interest Groups in Washington-More
Groups, Less Clout, in A. King, ed, The New American Political System 203, 225-26 (AEI
1990); Wright, Interest Groups and Congress at 75 (cited in note 180) (noting that interest
groups achieve influence by strategically providing information to lawmakers).
'WWildavsky, New Politics at 257 (cited in note 1), quoting Ronald Grover, With
Gramm-Rudman, Lobbying Will Never Be the Same, Business Week 33 (Feb 17, 1986). See
also Wildavsky and Caiden, New Politics at 134 (cited in note 8) ("The entire budget, not
just parts of special interest, has become relevant to all the participants.").
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be producing the same amount of information now but targeting
it differently in order to concentrate on areas left undeveloped by
interest group conflict. For example, government entities may
have redeployed their resources to study revenue-losing struc-
tural changes that are favored by tax policy entrepreneurs but
lack broader political momentum.210
Detecting any shift in the activity of government staff is par-
ticularly important because PAYGO applies to all revenue laws,
setting up additional legislative hurdles whether the law is wise
or unwise, whether it meets tax policy goals or undermines
them. 11 Take, for example, integration of corporate and individ-
ual taxes to reduce the effective rate on income produced through
the corporate form.2'2 Given current estimating conventions, the
Joint Tax Committee will score any integration proposal as losing
significant revenue, which, under budget rules, must be offset. A
provision such as integration that lacks strong interest group
support and that does not resonate with the public is difficult
enough to enact through the regular legislative process;2" offset
requirements exacerbate the situation. While many organized
groups favor integration, the benefits are so widely dispersed that
interest group pressure in favor of this reform may be less in-
tense than for benefits more fully internalized by the members.
But if, as a response to budget conflict, private parties generate
information regarding other tax proposals, the technical staff of
the legislative and executive branches and other policy entrepre-
neurs may be able to spend more of their time on such a struc-
"'Revenue-raising proposals that serve tax policy goals may be easier to pass after
PAYGO than before because they will be supported not only by policy entrepreneurs but
also by hungry predators searching for offsets. See John F. Coverdale, Text as Limit: A
Plea for a Decent Respect for the Tax Code, 71 Tulane L Rev 1501, 1527-28 (1997) (noting
that amendments closing tax loopholes are increasingly attractive because they can be
used to meet offset requirements).
... See Garrett, 45 U Kan L Rev at 1177 (cited in note 32) ("Indeed, one of the certain
consequences of procedures that erect additional hurdles in the legislative process is that
the inertia that characterizes the process will become further entrenched, making it more
difficult to enact good laws, as well as bad ones.").
"See, for example, Department of the Treasury, Integration of the Individual and
Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing Business Income Once vii-ix (GPO 1992). See also Alvin
Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 Harv
L Rev 719, 798 (1981) ("Integration of the individual and corporate income taxes, whether
by shareholder credit or dividend deduction, would eliminate most of the defects of exist-
ing law.").
"3Although strong business coalitions like the American Council on Capital Formation
and the Business Roundtable have worked to enact capital gains relief, a proposal with
many of the characteristics of integration discussed in the text, integration lacks the ap-
peal with the public that the reduction in the capital gains rate appears to enjoy. More-
over, integration is only one of many tax policy reforms that lack strong constituencies and
are difficult to enact even without the additional burden of the budget rules.
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tural issue neglected in the clash of interest groups. This in-
creased attention may help overcome the legislative inertia that
has been made stronger by the additional hurdle of PAYGO.214
Another factor that determines the value of information is its
accuracy. Again, drawing firm conclusions here is difficult. The
beneficiaries of tax expenditures and the proponents of new ones
often have access to much better information about their busi-
nesses and their ability to use particular tax subsidies than do
government experts. Indeed, in many cases, government estima-
tors meet with affected parties to obtain information so that their
projections will more accurately predict taxpayer behavior.215 On
the other hand, interest groups have every incentive to skew in-
formation to favor their positions. The system, however, does pro-
vide a variety of rather porous checks on accuracy. The conflict
engendered by budget rules acts may keep groups relatively hon-
est because opponents will scrutinize their claims closely, and
government specialists can spend time assessing the merit of pri-
vate studies and other information. Policy entrepreneurs in think
tanks and public interest organizations also may present critical
perspectives and question the methodology employed by inter-
ested parties. Groups are well aware that if lawmakers or estima-
tors catch them lying or misrepresenting facts, they may lose
their credibility on the Hill and their access to key policymakers.
That is a particularly potent enforcement mechanism with re-
spect to lobbyists, who are repeat players and whose reputations
for providing trustworthy information are among their most
valuable assets. Although this informal sanction may work to dis-
courage outright falsehoods, one suspects that most privately
generated information, which is designed to further particular
agendas, will be incomplete and somewhat biased.
Thus, the role of offset requirements and budget conflict in
producing information is large but of questionable value. Cer-
tainly, groups augment government disclosure, but perhaps with
some duplication of effort. Moreover, the information may not be
as accurate as that which could be provided by more neutral
sources. However, if it is dominated by offset requirements and
214 Thus, one could study the subject matter of tax policy studies produced by govern-
ment staff to measure the change over the relevant time period. Of course, it may be diffi-
cult to find agreement on what constitutes a "good" structural change, but perhaps one
could observe general trends.
25 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv
L Rev 1669, 1714 (1975) (noting that administrative agencies tend "to rely ... on facts and
arguments by regulated firms," although in theory "agency staff can gather information on
its own").
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controlled by legislators willing to impose punishment on those
caught lying, the system may provide internal safeguards. Offset
requirements may play another, arguably more vital, role in the
review process: they structure the presentation of privately pro-
duced and officially disclosed information to lawmakers so that it
is easier to comprehend and to use as the basis for policy deci-
sions.
B. Offset Requirements Operate as a Surrogate for
Institutionalized Tax Expenditure Review
Regardless of who generates information, it only will be used
effectively if there is a structure for disclosure followed by delib-
eration. Knowing this, advocates of tax expenditure analysis do
not favor disclosure simply for disclosure's sake-they want the
information actually to affect public policy. Supporters seem to
envision a world where lawmakers absorb all imaginable infor-
mation, consider all possible tax policy ramifications, and scruti-
nize all conceivable political considerations.21 For example, Pro-
fessors Surrey and McDaniel argue that "orderly government re-
quires both the development of criteria to determine the choice
between tax and direct expenditures, and an analysis of the pos-
sible consequences of each choice."217 They do not indicate, how-
ever, how they expect Congress to undertake that analysis, nor do
they acknowledge all the realities that face legislators with lim-
ited abilities to process information.2"8 In a review of their 1985
book on tax expenditures, Bernard Wolfman noted this problem
in the tax expenditure agenda:
The legislative process is political. I believe that any effort to
inject a mandatory, rigid mechanism into that process will
fail.... [Members of Congress] are likely to be more recep-
tive to a tool they select because they find it right for the job
at hand than they will be to a program they are told they
must apply universally because rationality requires it.2"9
"'See Eismeier, 1 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt at 338 (cited in note 199) (also noting that
"the problem Congress often faces is not getting more information but making use of in-
formation it already has, a process one former member of the Ways and Means Committee
likened to 'getting a drink from a fire hydrant').
"'See Surrey and McDaniel, Tax Expenditures at 27 (cited in note 25).
"'See Louis Fisher, Presidential Spending Power 263-64 (Princeton 1975) (noting that
the compilation, analysis, and dissemination of information must be done with a "fine
sense of selectivity" and advising that "[dlistinctions need to be made between the routine
and the significant).
"'Wolfnan, 99 Harv L Rev at 498 (cited in note 199).
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Professor Wolfman's accurate observation does not mean that we
must give up on the effort to improve the tax legislative process,
but it does suggest that we may have to be creative and that pro-
posals must take politics into account.
Various methods to institutionalize tax expenditure analysis
do exist. Successful structures would share at least two charac-
teristics. First, the process should include some sort of enforce-
ment, either formal or informal, to increase the chance that leg-
islators actually will consider relevant information and argu-
ments. For example, since 1981, the CBO has been required to
produce information about the cost of complying with federal
legislation for state and local governments. This information,
however, played almost no role in congressional decisionmaking
until 1996, when the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act established
points of order to ensure its timely disclosure and to allow an op-
portunity for focused deliberation.22 ° No enforcement procedure
can dictate the content of congressional deliberation or require
that political decisions be made only on certain grounds. It can,
however, allow an opportunity for discussion and make relevant
issues more salient to legislators, interest groups, and the public.
Second, the procedure must include heuristic or other devices to
structure and limit information so that lawmakers do not find
themselves paralyzed by an overwhelming amount of data."'
Several reforms along these lines have been suggested. For
example, tax expenditures could be enacted with sunset provi-
sions. This would give Congress a regular opportunity to consider
the tax policy and political issues raised by the tax expenditure.'
Since the late 1970s, a group of tax provisions has formed a pack-
age of "extenders" that Congress has enacted temporarily and ex-
tended periodically.' These include the targeted jobs tax
credit,' the orphan drug credit,2" the low-income housing
credit,"5 the exclusion for employer-provided educational assis-
-Pub L No 104-4, 109 Stat 48 (1995), codified at 2 USCA §§ 1501 et seq (Supp 1997).
See also Garrett, 45 U Kan L Rev at 1160 (cited in note 32).
"See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive
Influence in Political Institutions, 88 Mich L Rev 917, 940-41 (1990) (explaining heuristics
and how they can assist legislative analysis).
It would also give them an opportunity to extract rent. See text accompanying note
193.
"See, for example, Joint Tax Committee, Description of a Proposal to Extend Certain
Expiring Tax Provisions, Repeal the Luxury Excise Tax on Certain Items, and Adopt Reve-
nue-Raising Provisions JCX-23-92 (June 16, 1992). See also Pat Jones, New Day May
Dawn for Sunset Tax Provisions, Tax Notes 1587 (Mar 13, 1995).
"IRC § 51 (1994).
EIRC § 45C (Supp 1997).
"IRC § 42 (1988).
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tance,"7 and the deduction of health insurance costs for the self-
employed.' Congressional scrutiny of these provisions has been
relatively intense and certainly more sustained than the atten-
tion the legislature pays to most other tax expenditures. Congress
also has refused to extend some of them, such as the exclusion for
employer-provided group legal services, which expired in 1992.'
It has made others permanent, such as the low-income housing
credit, which transcended extender status in the 1993 reconcilia-
tion act,20 and the health care deduction for the self-employed,
which became permanent in 1 9 9 6 ."e Meanwhile, others have
changed form; the targeted jobs tax credit was transformed into
the work opportunity credit in 1996,2 although the transforma-
tion was primarily nominal. 3 Thus, one way to institutionalize
and enforce the opportunity for tax expenditure analysis is to
sunset all such provisions periodically, perhaps in a staggered
fashion. If Congress wanted to place more obstacles in the way of
continuing provisions that are set to expire, budget rules could
require that revenue lost from any reenacted provision be offset
by spending reductions elsewhere in the budget.
Another reform would rely on a familiar device-the instruc-
tions to the committees in the annual concurrent budget resolu-
tion.' The budget resolution could require that the tax writing
committees reduce the amount of revenue lost through tax ex-
penditures by a certain amount and enforce the requirement
through a point of order procedure. More innovative reforms are
also possible; for example, several senators have proposed a Cor-
porate Subsidy Reform Commission that would identify and re-
view "federal subsidies, including tax advantages, provided by the
Federal Government to entities or industries in profit making en-
2"IRC § 127 (1994).
2IRC § 162 (1994).
-26 USC § 120(e) (1994).
'"See OBRA 1993, Title XIII § 13142, 107 Stat at 438.
"
1 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 311, Pub L No 104-
191, 110 Stat 1936,2053, codified at IRC § 162 (Supp 1997).
' IRC § 51 (1994). See note 75.
'The work opportunity credit does, however, have fewer targeted groups, an in-
creased minimum period in which the employee must work for an employer, and is
slightly more generous. Another extender that has changed form is the credit for research
and experimentation, IRC § 41 (1994); the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996
§ 1204 added an alternative incremental credit to the traditional credit, although both
remain temporary. Pub L No 104-188, 110 Stat 1755, 1773, codified at IRC § 41 (Supp
1997).
See Surrey and McDaniel, Tax Expenditure Concept at 144 (cited in note 202); Lance
T. LeLoup, The First Decade: Evaluating Congressional Budget Reforms, in Kenneth A.
Shepsle, ed, The Congressional Budget Process: Some Views from the Inside 129, 153 (Cen-
ter for the Study of Am Bus 1980).
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terprises."2s The proposal would require the Commission to sub-
mit recommendations to the President and would allow Congress
to consider through expedited procedures any of his suggestions.
Congress could enact additional procedures to insulate the Com-
mission's recommendations more completely from politics, fol-
lowing the example of the Base Closure and Realignment Com-
mission, whose recommendations for closing military bases Con-
gress had to accept or reject as a whole, without amending the
Commission's list."6
These mechanisms are relatively straightforward attempts to
scrutinize, and perhaps repeal, simplify, or otherwise modify, tax
expenditures. They suffer, however, from a significant political
problem that does not beset offset requirements-they require
Congress to agree on what provisions should be considered as tax
expenditures. 7 Currently, Treasury and the Joint Tax Commit-
tee differ slightly in their understandings of the proper defini-
tion."s More importantly, members of Congress find the concept
to be highly contestable, with some members, including the
chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, expressing funda-
mental disagreement with the basic notion that some tax provi-
sions are the equivalent of federal spending and subsidy pro-
grams. 9 Offset requirements, which indirectly spark a kind of
'The Corporate Subsidy Reform Commission Act of 1997, S 207, 105th Cong, 1st
Sess, in 143 Cong Rec S 729 (Jan 28, 1997) (by Senator McCain and others). See Fitts, 88
Mich L Rev at 963-64 (cited in note 221) (discussing tool of government commissions as a
strategy to manage information).
'National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Title XXIDL Defense Base
Closures and Realignments § 2908(d)(1)-(2), Pub L No 101-510, 104 Stat 1485, 1817
(1990).
'I am assuming that Congress would want to apply enforcement provisions only to a
limited set of tax provisions, rather than implementing a review procedure for all tax pro-
visions, even those necessary to define the tax base accurately.
See Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 1998, H Doc 105-003 at 84-
85 (cited in note 58) (describing difference in the normal tax baseline used by Joint Tax
and the reference tax baseline used by the administration, the measures used to deter-
mine deviations). See Wolfman, 99 Harv L Rev at 492 (cited in note 199) (summarizing the
difference between tax expenditures and normative provisions).
'See Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 Duke L J 1155, 1171
(noting that many members of Congress see repealing a tax expenditure as a tax increase,
not a spending reduction). See, for example, 142 Cong Rec S 5252 (May 17, 1996) (remarks
of Senator Domenici) ("What are tax expenditures and corporate loopholes? Frankly, there
are two ways to look at it. One way to think about it is they were taxes that the Govern-
ment owned, and we said we are not going to collect them. That is a Democrat version of a
tax expenditure. The other version is they belong to the taxpayer and not the Govern-
ment."); 132 Cong Rec E 899 (Mar 20, 1986) (remarks of Harry K. Wells, put into the rec-
ord by Representative Helen Delich Bentley) ('[S]ome personal tax deductions including
interest paid on home mortgages are being referred to as tax expenditures to the taxpayer,
an interesting turn of phrase! Clearly indicating the idea, it's the government's money
that they are expending on you-a pretty scarey [sic] prospect for a country that believes
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tax expenditure analysis, may be superior to other proposals be-
cause no definition of tax expenditure is necessary as a threshold
matter. Rather, current budget rules rely on the groups them-
selves to target particular provisions to raise revenue. My previ-
ous analysis suggests that many of these will inevitably be tax
expenditures as policy analysts have come to use that term. Fur-
ther empirical work on the nature of tax provisions that have
been used to raise revenue under PAYGO is needed to confirm
this conclusion; however, any casual analysis of the revenue pro-
visions of tax bills during this decade indicates that the drafters
of tax bills raise substantial revenue by modifying economic in-
centives and other special benefits in the tax code, as well as by
enacting higher excise taxes and (usually disguised) tax rate in-
creases.
If offset requirements institutionalize a kind of tax expendi-
ture analysis that avoids controversial political difficulties be-
cause they do not require Congress to define precisely the notion
of tax expenditure, why has this positive consequence of the
budget rules been overlooked? The real problem may be that the
review prompted by PAYGO is not the same as that envisioned by
theorists who favor tax expenditure analysis. For example, one
goal of tax expenditure review is to simplify the tax code, in most
cases through repealing tax expenditures (and perhaps replacing
them with direct subsidies) or by streamlining the provisions that
survive scrutiny." ° The kind of review prompted by offset re-
quirements seldom leads to greater simplicity in the tax code.
Rather, it leads to an opposite result; compromise is forged
through legislative deals that further complicate the revenue
laws."' In the few cases of outright repeal, transition provisions
often complicate the tax system. Those who propose revenue-
raising provisions will agree to carve out exemptions for stronger
interest groups, or they will redraft offset proposals so that bene-
ficiaries still receive some, albeit less generous, subsidy though
the tax code. This kind of compromise results in increased com-
plexity; for example, the opposition to the depreciation recapture
provision in the 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act resulted in an entirely
different tax rate for this kind of gain-neither the new capital
in free enterprise and democracy.").
'See, for example, Surrey and McDaniel, Tax Expenditures at 26 (cited in note 25);
Shapiro, Complexity in the Tax Legislative Process at I-J-8 (cited in note 14).
'See Elizabeth Garrett, The Legislative Process and the Dynamics of Tax Complexity,
Testimony before the National Commission on Restructuring the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice (Nov 8, 1996) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
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gains rate nor the rate for ordinary income. 2 Review that results
in greater complexity is particularly troubling because the obfus-
cation inherent in complicated tax laws reduces legislative ac-
countability.2' This consequence undermines one of the primary
objectives of both tax expenditure analysis and the budget pro-
cess: to increase the transparency of congressional decisionmak-
ing.
More generally, there is no reason to believe that, in the
course of the offset process, tax expenditures are reviewed along
the dimensions that tax policy analysts deem important. Al-
though participants in the tax legislative process have long been
attacked as insufficiently attentive to "significant tax policy
analysis,"2 these cries are louder now that budget considerations
hold a more prominent position during the bills' formulation. Ad-
vocates of new spending probably do not choose to target existing
provisions because the proposed offsets violate good tax policy;
instead, they seek out provisions that will raise sufficient reve-
nues while sparking minimal opposition. In other words, the con-
siderations used in targeting are not necessarily close proxies for
the considerations that drive ideal tax policy analysis. Even if the
interest groups' arguments are couched in terms of efficiency, eq-
uity, and other noble principles, this rhetoric is usually cloaking
the power struggle that actually will determine the outcome.
These criticisms may be on the mark, but they also can be
aimed at the more formalized review structures that tax policy
analysts have traditionally supported. Political considerations
will force compromise regardless of the forum, and compromise
causes complexity. When the interests of strong, organized
groups clash with the objective of simplification, politicians usu-
ally side with the former.2" Because of the truncated budget win-
dow, however, PAYGO may cause more complexity in the tax
laws than other forms of institutionalized review. As I discussed
previously, predators try to draft their tax expenditures so that
most of the revenue loss occurs in the out-years and so that any
"'See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 311, 111 Stat at 836.
'See Shuman, Politics and the Budget at 337 (cited in note 9). See also Joseph M.
Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Gov-
ernment 214-15 (Chicago 1994) (listing complexity as an impediment to public delibera-
tion).
' "See Shapiro, Complexity in the Tax Legislative Process at I-J-14 (cited in note 14).
'See Report of the National Commission on Restructuring the Internal Revenue
Service, A Vision for a New IRS 36-37 (June 25, 1997) (recommending adoption of proce-
dures, including a Tax Complexity scorecard, to increase the prominence of issues of com-
plexity in the legislative process); Gene Steuerle, Who Makes the Case for Tax Simplifica-
tion?, Tax Notes 279 (July 14, 1997).
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behavior that would result in revenue gains occurs in the early
years." The result is greater complexity than the inevitable po-
litical compromises would bring; one need only look at the provi-
sions establishing the back-loaded Roth IRA to understand how
the budget window, together with a cash-flow method of valua-
tion, undermines the objective of simplification. Nonetheless, no
form of tax expenditure review is likely to force lawmakers to
pass simple laws at the cost of interest group support.
The experience with extenders-the tax provisions that ex-
pire, forcing congressional reconsideration every few years-sug-
gests that many of the problems that arise with PAYGO will also
plague other efforts to institutionalize and enforce tax expendi-
ture review. 7 Take the example of the targeted jobs tax credit.
The vast majority of studies on the targeted jobs tax credit sug-
gested it had only a minimal effect on employer hiring decisions
and did not lead to permanent jobs.' Nevertheless, Congress
consistently extended the credit, made it permanent at one point,
and finally "reformed" it by making only slight modifications (in-
cluding reinstating its temporary status) and changing its name.
It was not simplified, nor was it revised significantly to incorpo-
rate the tax policy concerns voiced during oversight hearings. On
the other hand, just as the traditional approaches to tax expendi-
ture analysis may cause lawmakers to assess the efficiency, com-
plexity, and fairness of the status quo, so may the deliberation
sparked by offset requirements. Procedural frameworks cannot
dictate the content of congressional deliberation; they can only
help to give members the opportunity to deliberate and to in-
crease the chance that voters will be able to hold their represen-
'' See text accompanying notes 96-102.
'Perhaps tax policy considerations are more likely to play a role if politically insu-
lated commissions conduct the review. But such commissions are not entirely free from
political influences, and their recommendations ultimately reach the legislative and
regulatory arenas, where the typical political concerns largely determine their fate. In ad-
dition, it is not clear that decisions about the structure of the tax law are properly made
by actors who are relatively unaccountable to the electorate; rather, they seem the kind of
decision most properly vested in democratic institutions. See Eismeier, 1 J Pol Analysis &
Mgmt at 339 (cited in note 199) (citing as a misperception the view "that normative judg-
ments about taxation and other policies should be made though a technical analytical pro-
cess rather than through political interaction7). See also Wldavsky, Politics of the Budget-
ary Process at 191 (cited in note 9) (arguing that budgeting in general should take account
of political considerations).
'See, for example, John H. Bishop and Mark Montgomery, Does the Targeted Jobs
Tax Credit Create Jobs at Subsidized Firms?, 23 Industrial Relations 289 (1993); Hearings
on the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit before the Employment, Housing, and Aviation Subcom-
mittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 103d Cong, 2d Sess (Sept 20,
1994) (testimony of Charles C. Masten, Inspector General of the Department of Labor).
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tatives accountable. In some cases they can increase the salience
of certain issues for both policymakers and voters.
The role that PAYGO and offset requirements can play in tax
expenditure analysis has been overlooked and underappreciated.
My goal in this Part has not been to convince readers that such
rules are the only or necessarily the best way to institutionalize
review. Rather, I hope to show that they may avoid the difficult
political problem of reaching a widely accepted definition of tax
expenditures, while achieving review of existing and proposed tax
subsidies that differs little from the deliberation that the over-
sight procedures long advocated by tax policy analysts would pro-
duce. Focusing attention on PAYGO, an existing real-world pro-
vision, is also a more practical approach than continued emphasis
on idealized procedures that have yet to interest lawmakers.
As policymakers come to view PAYGO as the key element in
structuring sustained consideration of tax expenditures, they
may wish to consider amendments to the budget rules to toughen
that review. If the availability of money in the direct spending
arena is reducing pressure on tax provisions, then PAYGO could
be narrowed so that revenue neutrality in tax legislation could
come only from other changes in the code, not in decreased enti-
tlement spending. Alternatively, Congress could amend the
budget rules to require proponents of new tax subsidies to raise
$2 in revenues for every $1 of new tax subsidy they receive,
thereby prompting greater pressure for oversight of the current
system. 9 Such a change, accompanied by lockbox provisions to
ensure that the savings are not used in subsequent bills for new
programs, would also transform offset requirements from deficit
control weapons to deficit reduction tools by increasing the reve-
nue the government takes in with every new tax bill. Thus, con-
sideration of this reform would include determining whether the
public supported larger budgeting outcomes, as well as assessing
the reform's effects on PAYGO's important information-
structuring role. If lawmakers come to view PAYGO as a way to
enforce tax expenditure review, they may be more likely to retain
the procedure even in years when the federal budget is balanced
'I am indebted to George Yin for discussions on this issue. See Midcourse Review of
the Budget Enforcement Act, Hearing before the House Budget Committee's Task Force on
Budget Process, Reconciliation and Enforcement, 102d Cong, 1st Sess 61 (Oct 10, 1991)
(statement of Allen Schick) (urging that PAYGO "be revised to commit [at least] a portion
of legislated revenue increases to reducing the deficit"). Congress has used procedural de-
vices such as deficit lockboxes to ensure that money raised through changes to the tax
laws or through program elimination is used to reduce the federal deficit rather than re-
maining available to offset new spending.
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or in surplus." In the end, a better strategy for proponents of
rigorous and meaningful tax expenditure analysis is likely to be
modifying PAYGO, a procedure that is an established part of the
tax legislative process, rather than continuing to advocate the
adoption of other mechanisms that might spark congressional
deliberation of these issues.
CONCLUSION
Competition among interest groups in budgeting is inevita-
ble, so congressional procedures should be constructed to harness
this competition in order to use it to its fullest advantage. After
more than a decade of experience with offset requirements in the
tax legislative process, we can now assess their value and con-
sider changes. The necessity of this sort of analysis may be even
more pressing as Congress continues to consider constitutional-
izing a balanced federal budget."5 Reaching the best decision
about this reform, or other budget proposals, requires a full un-
derstanding of all the costs and benefits, as well as a sophisti-
cated awareness of the ways that offset requirements actually re-
duce the level of new federal spending, in the tax code and else-
where. As part of this analysis, policymakers should give due
consideration to the previously unidentified benefits of offset re-
quirements: their role in both producing information about fed-
eral tax programs and structuring informed deliberation about
allocative choices.
'See Letter to Pete V. Domenici, Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, from
June E. O'Neill, Director of the CBO (Oct 29, 1997) (on file with U Chi L Rev) (providing
CBO's analysis of the statutory language establishing PAYGO and stating that the provi-
sion would apply to revenue and direct spending legislation whether or not the federal
government was running a budget deficit).
"'See Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment that Does
What it is Supposed to Do (And No More), 106 Yale L J 1449 (1997); Shaviro, Do Deficits
Matter? at 256-68 (cited in note 94).
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